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Chapter One 
Post-conflict elections are expected to establish domestic and international 
legitimacy, institute a process of democratization, promote reconciliation, and lay the 
groundwork for lasting peace.  This is expected to take place in an environment where 
violence and civil war have critically damaged infrastructure and national security, as 
well as undermined social economic and political institutions.  Left in the wake of 
conflict is a population in fear of violent uprisings and corrupt leaders.  Under these 
circumstances, post-conflict elections almost seem predestined for failure which could 
result in further conflict and regional instability.  
The cost of post-conflict elections is high.  The actual expenditure in dollars is 
difficult to assess due to the complexity of post-conflict environments and the number of 
not-for-profit agencies, volunteers, and non-governmental organizations involved.  Post-
conflict reconstruction and elections require extensive resources (materials, money, and 
manpower) from the very start.  In order to better assess the actual need, international 
organizations are starting to collect data on the actual cost of conducting post-conflict 
elections.  In a 2006 study on the cost of elections, the Center for Post-Conflict 
Governance (CPCG) at the International Foundation for Electoral Systems (IFES) 
estimated the “2005 election in Iraq cost over $180 million” (Fischer & López–Pintor, 
2006, p. 134). Iraq was only one of several post-conflict elections held that year including 
several in Africa such as Burundi, the Central African Republic, and Liberia (Frere, 
2011).  Aside from the quantifiable costs, there are also the greater costs of lives lost and 
the potential for a fragile peace to be destroyed.  Ineffective elections can potentially lead 
“to a reversal in the peace process, costing thousands of additional lives, wasting millions 
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of dollars, time, and energy e.g. Haiti and Angola” (Orr, 2002, p. 142).  Savo Heleta’s 
research concludes that when conducted too early or in the absence of certain criteria, 
“elections would not lead to pluralism and democracy but rather instability, further 
polarization, and post-election chaos” (Heleta, 2010, p. 1).  Therefore, according to 
Heleta, defining the criteria for successful post-conflict elections in order to pick an 
optimal time for their conduction is critical in giving democracy the greatest chance to 
survive.   
US foreign policy often maintains that democratization leads to global security so 
it is almost certain there will be a lasting commitment to and investment in post-conflict 
elections.  Historically, it has been the political norm for US policy to accept the 
“democratic peace thesis (DPT), which maintains that consolidated democracies both 
have historically and will not in the future go to war with each other” (Russett, 1991, p. 
4).  This concept is not original to the US or new to political policy.  Before the concept 
was known as DPT, it was theorized by Immanuel Kant who proclaimed “enlightened 
people can make itself a republic…and thus secure freedom under the idea of the law of 
nations” (Kant, 2007, p. 19) and Thomas Paine who wrote of a time “when republican 
peace will reign through the world” (Remsburg, 1916, p. 56).  DPT is seen in US foreign 
policy through Woodrow Wilson’s support for the League of Nations (Wilson, 1918) and 
Franklin Roosevelt’s support for the United Nations (Roosevelt, 1942).  More recent 
policy makers include Presidents Bill Clinton “who argued democratization would be the 
antidote to international war and civil strife” (Snyder, 2002, p. 15), and George W. Bush 
in 2005 when he stated “It is the policy of the United States to seek and support the 
growth of democratic movements and institutions in every nation and culture, with the 
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ultimate goal of ending tyranny in our world” (Bush, 2005) and currently when Barack 
Obama said in his Nobel Peace Prize acceptance speech “Only when Europe became free 
did it finally find peace.  America has never fought a war against a democracy” (Obama, 
2009).   
Although DPT is present in US foreign policy, it is not agreed upon throughout 
the academic community.  There is a good deal of academic literature critical of DPT.  
Most critics agree “to a degree...in the modern international system, democracies have 
almost never fought each other” (Russett, 1991, p. 1).  However, they argue that DPT is 
improperly interpreted as “intellectual justification for the belief that spreading 
democracy abroad will perform the dual task of enhancing American national security 
and promoting world peace” (Rosato, 2003, p. 585).  Prevalent amongst arguments 
critical of DPT are the following two concepts: (1) democratically elected leaders are not 
universally peaceful leaders “accountable to peace loving publics” and (2) democracies 
still fight wars and “are not particularly slow to mobilize or incapable of surprise attack” 
(Rosato, 2003, p. 585).  Research critical of DPT warns “governments produced by 
elections may be inefficient, corrupt, shortsighted, irresponsible, dominated by special 
interests and incapable of adopting policies demanded by the public good” (Huntington, 
1991, p. 10).  In The Rise of Illiberal Democracy, Fareed Zakaria argues democratic 
elections often produce powerful leaders rather than good leaders.  He warns in crisis 
these leaders will “not be able to rule effectively… [and] become predatory, maintaining 
some order but also arresting opponents, muzzling dissent, nationalizing industries, and 
confiscating property” (Zakaria, 1997, p. 34).  Zakaria’s work also suggests that 
democracy should not be defined as elections alone and that elections in the absence of 
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other critical democratic factors like freedom of speech, freedom of the press and a 
separation of powers could lead to failed elections or empowering the wrong people.  As 
for the concept of democracy leading to peace, Russet argues that in accepting DPT many 
have “become confused with a claim that democracies are in general, in dealing with all 
kinds of states, more peaceful than are authoritarian or other non-democratically 
constituted states” (Russett, 1991, p. 11).  There is overwhelming evidence that 
democracies are not inherently peaceful and that “Kant was clearly wrong in his 
presumption that democracies are inherently peaceful” (Dixon, 1994, p. 1).  However, 
Kant’s work should not be completely discarded because although it is a fact democracies 
are capable and willing to go to war, political scientist Michael Doyle concludes that 
Kant is still relevant and that “liberalism does leave a coherent legacy on foreign affairs” 
(Doyle, 1986, p. 1151).  History is full of examples of wars started by democracies, such 
as the American Civil War, the War of 1812, the Spanish-American War, World War I, 
democratically appointed Adolf Hitler in WWII, and US led wars in Iraq (1991 and 2003) 
and Afghanistan.  In addition to starting wars, many of the wars were fought with 
democracies on both sides clearly indicating democracies do fight democracies.  Within 
the study of emerging democracies there is also evidence contrary to DPT concluding 
that “emerging democracies tend to be more violent and aggressive than any other type of 
regime—and are more likely to erupt in civil war or revert to autocratic rule” (Mansfield 
& Snyder, 2005, p. 53).  Critics of DPT conclusively argue democratically elected leaders 
can be and have been problematic and dangerous leaders causing further conflict and 
even war.   
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This research acknowledges the differing academic opinions on DPT, but does not 
attempt conclusively to defend or critique the theory.  Instead, it argues that DPT has and 
continues to influence US foreign policy, all be it at times misinterpreted and 
romanticized such as in President Ronald Reagan’s argument that “a world order run by 
democratic states would be more prosperous, pacific, and morally superior to any other” 
(Smith, 1994, p. 268).  Additionally, the concept of democratization as war termination is 
present in many recent post-conflict areas including the cases covered within this 
research.   The international community sees democratization and subsequent elections as 
symbolizing the end of conflict and the exit for international intervention (Mantanock, 
2013, p. 14).  This concept is not only present in US policy but this is also the case within 
the international peacekeeping community and “has been the case in Angola (1992), 
Cambodia (1993), El Salvador (1994), Mozambique (1994), BiH [Bosnia and 
Herzegovina] (1996), Liberia (1997 &2005), Sierra Leone (2002) and Democratic 
Republic of Congo (2006)-among others” (Guterres, 2008, p. 14).  Thus, for “the 
international community, post-conflict elections are an important signal that legitimate 
democratic authority has returned (or instituted) and on the ground presence of the 
international community may be coming to an end” (Ndulo & Lulo, 2010, p. 169). 
There is a good amount of research available on the criteria for success in post-
conflict elections.  Most researchers explain post-conflict election success within a set of 
certain criteria.  Although not always the same, there are some criteria which consistently 
reoccur in academic research.  Most research agrees the presence of these criteria is an 
indicator of possible post-conflict election success.  It is less definitive if all criteria must 
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be present.  Specifically, in the absence of one or more criteria, can a strong presence of 
another mitigate the difference and lead to success?   
I. Research Question 
 
 Previous research on post-conflict elections has found several criteria important in 
determining if an area is ready to hold elections and whether or not it is likely to succeed.  
Although rarely ranked in any determination of importance, several concepts are present 
in most post-conflict election research.  Additionally, there is not an agreed set of 
standard criteria upon which success can be assumed.  When researching the post-conflict 
election literature two questions arise:  (1) is there a set of criteria established to 
determine if an area is ready to conduct post-conflict elections, and (2) do all criteria need 
to be present in order to ensure successful post-conflict elections?   
 Most research agrees on common criteria but highlights or researches one 
dominant criterion, to which is then often attributed to the success of an election.  This is 
found in Krishna Kumar’s focus on international assistance (Kumar, 1998), Staffan 
Lindberg’s attribution of success to repetition of the election process (Lindberg, 2006), 
Paul Collier’s focus on per capita income (Collier, 2009), and Marie-Soleil Frere’s 
research on post-conflict elections and the media (Frere, 2011).  When reviewing 
multiple research sources, it is likely several factors at various times and in various 
elections will be credited with being the single source criterion for success.  This kind of 
past research is well supported and conclusively argued, but still fails to provide a scope 
of understanding outside of a single event.  In other words, it is case specific and not 
comparatively applicable across cases.  Although this thesis does not intend to 
“McDonaldize” (Ritzer, 2009) the process of democratization, it does propose to define a 
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common set of criteria necessary, even if in varying degrees, to conduct successful 
elections in post-conflict environments.   
II. Executive Summary  
 This research is a case study of three post-conflict elections: Iraq (2010), Sierra 
Leone (2007) and Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) (2010).  In January 2010, there were 
112,000 US combat troops in Iraq occupying over 90 military bases throughout the 
country.  Despite the official classification of post-conflict, the country was very much 
still considered a combat zone with a prominent foreign military presence.  In 2007, 
Sierra Leone was two years removed from the 2005 United Nations mission completion 
and associated personnel withdrawal and five years from the official end of the war in 
2002.  Additionally, the United Kingdom (UK), who had provided the largest military 
contingent, had reduced its military numbers from 5,000 to less than 100 by 2007.  In 
2010, BiH was the furthest removed from combat operations (fifteen years) from official 
end of the war in 1995 and the most advanced in post-conflict democracy (fourteen years) 
with the first post-conflict election held in 1996.   
 These three elections were chosen because they are distinctly different, unlike 
previous research, which looked at single geographic areas such as Africa (Lindberg, 
2006; Frere, 2011) and Eastern Europe (Hart, 2006; Smilov, 2005).  Geographically, the 
cases in this research are located on different continents and have vastly different 
associated cultural norms and identities.  Each area also displayed a distinctly different 
placement on the post-conflict time line, with Iraq involved in combat operations and 
BiH in relative peaceful conditions and Sierra Leone somewhere in between.  Each 
conflict also experienced differing levels of military involvement.  Iraq was a US-led 
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combat operation with multiple coalition military forces deploying full combat units for 
extended periods and multiple rotations.  Sierra Leone was a smaller military operation 
with UK troops providing the largest contingent and only using smaller, specially trained 
elements to conduct offensive operations rather than the full combat units in Iraq.  
Finally, BiH was a multi-national military involvement with large and small-scale combat 
abilities but with only a limited use of ground troops.  Each country was also at very 
different maturity levels in their democracy process.  BiH was the most mature and 2010 
was its sixth post-conflict election.  Although Iraq and Sierra Leone were conducting 
their second national level post-conflict elections, Sierra Leone had a more extensive 
history with previous democratic elections than Iraq.   
Table 1 
Case Study Variables and Distinctions 
 
Note 1. Data source is O'Hanlon & Livingston, Brookings Iraq Index, 2004 
Note 2.  Data source is UN Department of Peacekeeping Missions, 2003, 2005.  
Note 3.  Data Source is NDI Voter Turnout Data, 2013.   
 
 While acknowledging the above mentioned differences, these elections did feature 
a number of similarities as well.  They involved democratic, international military 
involvement and cease-fire/peace negations that were contingent on a successful election.  
The election and electoral law were designed and heavily monitored by the international 
community.  Although the conflicts span over several decades, the three elections within 
Election 
international troop  
strength (highest  
count) 
# of countries  
contributing  
troops  
years since end of  
conflict Region 
Voter  
Turnout 
Average  
Regional  
Voter Turnout 
Iraq 302600 
 (n1) 
34  (1) NA Middle East 60.67%  (n2) NA 
Sierra Leone 17500 
 (n3) 
29  (n3) 5 Africa 76.31%  (n2) 65.52%  (n2) 
BiH 54000  
(n3) 
47  (n3) 15 Europe 56.51%  (n2) 67.64%  (n2) 
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this case study are within a three year window allowing for consistencies in data 
collection and election technologies.   
This work seeks to juxtapose the differences between these three post-conflict 
elections while also defining the similarities present.  This research will provide a set of 
criteria to determine if an area is able to hold successful post-conflict elections and 
answer if in the absence or weak presence of some criteria, can a dominant criterion make 
up the difference.   
III. Limitations of Research 
 
 The focus of this research is narrowed to the ability of an area to conduct a 
successful post-conflict election and evaluate a set of criteria at the time of the election.  
It does not include the success, character, or virtue of any given elected official.  It does 
not evaluate if democracy can lead to positive developments in human rights, social 
change, societal modernization, or improvements in the overall quality of life.  It does not 
attempt to define success as the presence of peace or claim that “post-conflict elections 
should aim to promote human rights, to protect minority rights and to institute political 
arrangements in which all groups are represented” (Ndulo & Lulo, 2010, p. 171).  This 
research focuses on the content of the election: voting laws, electoral laws, campaign 
laws, media usage and access.  Election success is defined simply as an area’s ability to 
conduct an election featuring the above mentioned criteria.   
This research is limited to the actual election and the electoral process but does 
not include the election results or democratic process, such as Orr’s argument that in 
post-conflict elections “the single most important factor…is the extent to which a 
coherent, legitimate government exists” (Orr, 2002, p. 138).  The quality of the post-
10 
 
election government is not a factor in this research.  Additionally elected leaders and 
reconstructed peace will not be evaluated, such as in BiH where it is argued the last 
“successive elections have returned nationalist leaders to power …showing the 
determination by all groups to maintain differences rather than seek reconciliation” 
(Ottaway, 2003, p. 318).   
For the purpose of this research, the case studies will focus on the national level 
election.  Each case contains both a national level election and several concurrent lower 
level elections.  In order to keep this research focused and comparative, the smaller 
elections will not be discussed.  This research attempts to define election consistently in 
its singular form.  This is not always possible as cited research does not always restrict 
data collection to a singular election but rather collects on the process on the whole 
including national level and small elections.  Including research of multiple simultaneous 
elections reduces the consistency of this research but the value added outweighs the noted 
inconsistency.   
 Another limitation is found in the source of data.  Most post-conflict countries 
lack the technology and ability to collect, analyze and disseminate election data.  
Therefore, the election data contained within this research is mainly compiled from 
international actors involved in post-conflict election administration.  This must be 
disclosed and considered as a possible source of data bias.  The same organizations 
collecting data also had direct roles in election administration.  The success or failure of 
an election to some extent reflects the success or failure of an international agency’s 
mission.  Their data collection could thus contain intentional or unintentional bias.  
Additionally, the involvement of international actors is a defined criteria contained within 
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this research.  Once again, the benefit added far supersedes the negative potential of 
research bias.  International actors are the leading source of data collection and are 
essential to post-conflict election research.    
IV. Research Design Summary 
 
 The elections contained within this research are considered successful.  Peace 
agreements were carefully debated and drafted including the blueprints for these 
elections.  They involved intellectual input from international officials as well as the 
organizations who would serve as election administrator and observers such as the United 
Nations.  These elections contained the necessary elements as defined and evaluated by 
the international community.  Although each election was composed of the same 
elements, the environments in which they were conducted were vastly different.   
Each area was considered post-conflict and able to conduct elections.  Each had 
varying degrees of the selected criteria.  Each criterion has some presence, but this 
research found the weakest criterion was reintegration of former combatants.  Previous 
research is inconsistent in both the concept and the definition of reintegration.  Some 
research strictly defines it as former militia leaders becoming elected officials (Mantuck, 
2013; Lyons, 2002).  Other research includes a much broader definition including all 
individuals associating themselves with combative organizations and reintegration simply 
defined as accepting the post-conflict government (Fausto, 2003).  Disarmament, 
Demobilization, and Reintegration of Ex-Combatants is a broad definition including 
concepts such as the “the process which allows ex-combatants and their families to adapt, 
economically and socially, to productive civilian life.  It generally entails the provision of 
a package of cash or in-kind compensation, training, and job- and income generating 
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projects” (Fusato, 2003, p. 4)  Bullets for Ballots offers a more direct political definition 
including the concept of legalizing  militant groups as a political groups able to 
participate in elections (Mantanock, 2013).  Post-Conflict Elections:  War Termination, 
Democratization, and Demilitarizing Politics includes the concept of “transforming 
militias into political parties” (Lyons, 2002, p. 12) and warns that failure to do so could 
undermine democratization.  The evaluation of reintegration success is also inconsistent 
and research acknowledges that “even as the demobilization process is underway, the 
warring factions remain armed to some degree” (Ndulo & Lulo, 2010, p. 163).  
Acceptance of the concept within post-conflict countries ranges from uncertain to 
negative.  In Sierra Leone “it is commonplace to hear comments such as “those who have 
ruined us are being given the chance to become better persons financially, academically 
and skills-wise” (NCDDR briefing, 2002)  This research concludes that the reintegration 
of former combatants did not contribute to successful elections in any of the cases 
studied.   
 The criterion found most prevalent and valuable was the media.  Each election 
studied had varying levels and types of media presence.  The media was used for voter 
education, candidate messaging, and election transparency.  Research on the press and 
post-conflict democracy concludes that “the free press is a defining characteristic of 
liberal democracies” and proclaims “a nearly perfect coincidence of democracy and press 
freedom” (Potter, 2010, p. 454). This research concludes that the media directly led to 
election success by ensuring the population was informed and educated on the voting 
process.  The media also enabled competitive candidates to reach voters directly.  This 
allowed voters to evaluate each candidate and reinforced the democratic principle of 
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competition.  Each voter knew there were options and various candidates and the media 
provided transparency to the whole process.  Media education campaigns ensured that 
voters remained informed and prepared.  They knew when the polls opened; they knew 
when the people were voting, and they were informed of the results.  This constant 
transparency gave voters confidence in the process.  Voter education eliminated “distrust 
and suspicion… (and) voters were educated about the function, rules, and regulations, 
procedures and structures”(Von Ginanth & Pittz, 2008, p. 16).  Once voters understood 
the process, elections gained legitimacy and support of the voters.    
Media alone, though, is not enough to lead to successful post-conflict elections.  It 
must be carefully tailored to the audience.  This research found this evident in the 
differing use of media in the cases studied such as Iraq’s use of social media and Sierra 
Leone’s use of radio.  In 2010 “around 21 percent of Iraqi adults used the internet to 
gather news” and by the 2010 election “everyone from the lowest ranking MP to the 
current Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki had a Facebook page and even a Twitter account” 
(Najam, 2012).  In Sierra Leone on the other hand, election information was disseminated 
over the radio which is “the preferred channel for information and communication for up 
to 90 percent of the population” (Oatley & Thapa, 2012, p. 7).  Successful media and 
journalists take into account issues such as literacy, power availability, broadcast range 
and access and experience in order to ensure the audience receives the message.  The 
proper use of media ensures the speed and transparency of information that is critical in 
installing voter confidence.  Information should be delivered in “all local languages and 
in as many different media as possible” (Von Gienanth & Pittz, 2008, p. 14).  Media 
outlets should also be aware that most post-conflict countries have a fear and distrust of 
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the press associated with a history of government run media.  Often voters see the media 
as corrupt or biased, owned by corrupt local governments or newly occupying 
international actors.  Media in post-conflict countries must be aware that “party-driven 
media plying on the fears and prejudices of the population can do untold damage in a 
nation that has only recently emerged from violent conflict” (Von Gienanth & Pittz, 
2008, p. 34).   
This research also concludes that the involvement of international actors is a 
necessary criterion in determining success in post-conflict elections.  Post-conflict 
countries often lack the infrastructure, resources (including but not limited to money), 
legitimacy, and experience to conduct successful elections.  In a comprehensive review of 
lessons learned by the international community supporting post-conflict elections, 
USAID found that international “assistance is important, if not crucial for the conduct of 
post-conflict elections” (Lopez-Pintor, 2005, p. ix).  The Governance and Social 
Development Research Center (GSDRC) examined best practices on elections and 
international assistance and found that assistance has been successful in drafting electoral 
law, voter education, election set up and management, and election observation.  It 
concluded that international assistance allows post-conflict elections legitimacy they 
would not have on their own (GSDRC, 2008).  This research does not claim to associate 
the same demonstrated success with post-conflict democracy referring to more 
comprehensive ideals such as peace, economic development, security, rule of law, and 
human rights.  This research does not discount the many examples of international 
intervention where research concluded it did not assist in success but conversely caused 
failure.  Continued academic interest and the passage of time have allowed researchers to 
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both evaluate the intervention itself and document the long-range ongoing consequences 
of failed international interventions.  William Easterly did just this in his research of 
Cold-war interventions.  He cited the example of post-war Nicaragua where in the city of  
Quilali it was after international intervention that the standard of living had reduced to 
“only 23 percent …drank milk regularly and only 30 percent ate any kind of meat, while 
70 percent lived in overcrowded housing…and nearly half the people over ten were 
illiterate” (Easterly, 2006, p. 887).  There are several other examples of the consequences 
of failed international intervention including civil wars in Angola, malnourishment and 
starvation in Uganda, and Al-Qaeda and the Taliban in Afghanistan.  This research 
concludes international actors contributed to the success of post-conflict elections and 
offers defense in subsequent chapters.  Additionally, although this thesis concludes that 
the literature generally agrees the international community does play an important role in 
post-conflict elections, it has not determined how large of a foot print is needed or for 
how long.  The recent success of the 2012 national elections in Libya was reportedly “in 
part due to the deep engagement of the international community” (O'Brien, 2012).  Yet 
international assistance in Libya was much smaller than in recent post-conflict countries 
such as Iraq and Afghanistan with no “boots on the ground.”  Instead of the large-scale 
military and political intervention there was a small foot print “tailored to the type of 
assistance sought by the Libyan interim authorities” (O'Brien, 2012).  The concept of 
length of international commitment also remains unanswered within this research.  Most 
literature agrees that “democracy is a long-term process” (Reilly, 2008, p. 14).  The 
international community’s role in assistance is not only necessary in the initial post-
conflict election but needed long-term for strengthening institutions and developing 
16 
 
political capacity (Bargiacchi, 2008).  This research was restricted by the amount of 
research included on the scope of international presence or the length of involvement as a 
factor in post-conflict success.  This research concludes that international involvement is 
consistent with the success of the elections within this research but did not define the 
requirements to achieve success or more importantly sustain democratic success.  In fact, 
in the lack of definitive research on long-term strategic planning will be discussed in 
length as part of the research’s conclusion. 
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Chapter Two 
 Research in post-conflict elections has increased in accordance with the 
importance the international community has placed upon them.  Academics are working 
to provide international investors with defined criteria to help ensure post-conflict 
election success and the subsequent growth of democracy. 
 Researchers have attributed election success to a variety of factors ranging from 
per capita income, the number of previous elections, the extent of international 
community involvement, ethnic homogeneity or diversity, and historical political 
systems.  Although it seems unlikely that election success is as easy to define as holding 
three elections or in countries making over $2,700 per capita per year, the data and 
processes used in previous research have greatly increased the understanding of post-
conflict elections.   
This research focuses on three national level, post-conflict elections: Iraq (2010), 
Sierra Leone (2007), and Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) (2010).  The standards for 
election success and the criteria for successful elections are outlined within this research.  
As previously noted, this research is confined to the election itself and not the success or 
failure of any subsequent elected parties, officials, or democratic ideals.  It is broken 
down in terms of defining the post-conflict environment, analyzing a specific election in 
order to determine success, and finally evaluating each election environment to determine 
whether or not previously defined criteria were present and, if so, to what extent they 
were or were not present.  
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I. Defining the Post-conflict Environment 
The research provided within this section relies on data collected through the 
international agencies conducting and monitoring the elections themselves.  As 
previously discussed, there is an opportunity for bias in this reporting as each agency’s 
success is directly tied to the success of the election itself.  Unfortunately, post-conflict 
nations are typically not capable of collecting and analyzing their own election data, and 
thus international agencies are often the only source of data available.   
II. Election Analysis 
 Each successful election is analyzed within the same set of criteria defined by the 
United Nations.  These criteria were established to ensure the definition of successful 
elections was more than just holding the election itself.  The United Nations adapted 
standards to better encompass both the elections and the governing processes.  The 
criteria are:  (1) the right of all voters to participate in the electoral process without 
hindrance; (2) freedom to campaign for all political parties; (3) secrecy of the ballot; (4) 
reasonable speed in the counting of ballots; (5) accountability and openness of the 
electoral process to the competing parties and (6) an acceptable electoral law.  Research 
on UN electoral work has “demonstrated how, since 1989, the United Nations has 
become an important source of international support and expertise in the conduct of 
democratic elections” (Rich, 2004, p. 14).  Research on aid in developing countries 
“argues [that] the United Nations plays a critical, if not decisive role” (Rich, 2004, p. 16) 
in post-conflict elections.  
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III. Evaluating the Post-conflict Election Environment 
 The criteria for evaluating a nation’s capability of holding successful elections are 
also not clearly defined.  This thesis incorporates research from several authors and 
includes the following criteria:  the existence of critical social infrastructure 
(Sivapathasundaram, 2004), the involvement of international actors (Lyons, 2002), the 
reintegration of former militant actors (Reilly, 2008), and access to free and fair media 
(Heleta, 2010).  
 There are several other criteria present in research on post-conflict elections.  This 
thesis does not discount their value to post-conflict democracy research however they lie 
outside its scope.  Collier’s use of economics in his research on a countries’ income 
threshold and its correlation to the reduction in the risk of political violence is well 
developed and argued.  A study for the National Bureau of Economic Research called the 
relationship between income and democracy a “notable empirical regularity” (Acemoglu, 
Johnson, Robinson, & Yared, 2005) in political research.  The relationship between 
income and democracy is present in political research and there is evidence of some 
correlation if not necessarily causality. Additionally, Lindberg’s almost constructivist 
theory that repetitive elections within themselves will foster democracy is also a valuable 
concept.  The idea that the repetition of elections themselves is the greatest predictor of 
future success in democracy is well developed but not entirely conclusive.  Additionally 
his research was conducted entirely in one region and this thesis was designed to address 
more universally accepted concepts.  The concepts and criteria contained within this 
emerging research are valuable and should not be discounted, but were too broad for the 
scope of this research.  This research was restricted to only four criteria.   
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The choice of the four criteria was based on personal experiences of the author 
who served in Iraq when designing this research topic.  During the 2010 elections several 
layers of effort and sacrifice were witnessed as part of the democratic process.  One area 
of effort was defining if an area was secure enough to conduct elections.  This concept 
and question is not uncommon in post-conflict research with a general agreement that if 
voters feared for their safety they would not turn out to vote.  Previous research has failed 
conclusively to define if security is necessary in the democratic process or fully to define 
security itself.  History offers several examples to the contrary.  One example is here in 
the US where voter intimidation, threats, and violence were all part of a failed attempt to 
keep women and African-Americans from voting.  Voters risked violence and voted in 
the absence of security.  Additionally defining security in places that have known 
generations of war, such as Afghanistan, also has several levels of complexity.   
The involvement of international actors was again chosen based upon personal 
experience working alongside the international community.  It was very difficult to 
research post-conflict elections without the assistance of international observers and 
documentation.  The reintegration of former combatants was chosen because of the 
complexity of the concept.  For instance, is it possible to classify an individual as a 
defeated combatant and expect them to surrender peacefully to the new government?  Is 
there any other time historically when this has been succeeded?  Generations later the 
international community continues to prosecute former Nazis for war crimes but is 
focused today on peacefully reintegrating former Taliban militants.  Finally, the use of 
free and fair media was chosen because of its accepted as a concept of democracy. 
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IV. Previous Research 
 Post-conflict elections have become a symbolic gesture indicating not only the 
end of conflict but the start of peaceful democracy.  Upon the success of democratic 
elections the international community ideally can start to reduce its footprint and prepare 
for an eventual withdrawal.  Still, this final step is fully dependent on successful 
elections.  Academics have researched and analyzed the multiple layers of post-conflict 
elections seeking to answer whether or not successful elections lead to:  lasting peace 
(Snyder, 2002; Guterres, 2008), improved respect for human rights (Von Gienanth & 
Pietz, 2008), security and stability (Brancati, 2011), financial and economic growth 
(Collier, 2007) and international political legitimacy (Brancati, 2011; Kumar, 1998). 
Post-conflict Elections, Democratization and International Assistance, by Krishna 
Kumar is a case study of eight elections which examines several aspects of the election 
process.  Its main focus is on international assistance, and the research concludes that 
“without international assistance, many post-conflict elections would simply not have 
materialized” (Kumar, 1998, p. vii).  Additionally, based on the case studies, Kumar 
attempts to define preconditions for successful elections as “a state capable of performing 
necessary functions; a negotiated consensus among former warring parties on the 
structure and functions of government; a demonstrable commitment by the peace accord 
signatories to implement its provisions; and progress toward demobilizing and 
reintegrating ex-combatants” (Kumar, 1998, p. vii). 
 Although this research stops short of providing a list of defined criteria, it cites a 
“number of factors and circumstances” (Kumar, 1998, p. 7) as assisting in 
democratization.  “The socio-cultural traditions, literacy and education, industrialization, 
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urbanization, and the vitality of the emerging middle class are some of the major factors 
associated with the institutionalization of democracies” (Kumar, 1998, p. 7).  These 
concepts were not used for this thesis but they do offer valuable insight into the cultural 
criteria of successful post-conflict elections and subsequent possible explanations as to 
why certain cultures are historically more likely to accept democratization than others.   
 Kumar breaks the concept of international assistance down into two distinct 
categories:  international community and electoral assistance.  Kumar defines “the term 
international community as all the multilateral and bilateral agencies, international 
organizations, philanthropic organizations, relief agencies, and private sector firms 
involved in development, conflict resolution, and humanitarian assistance” (Kumar, 
1998, p. 5).  Kumar defines “electoral assistance as the set of economic, technical, and 
political programs financed and often implemented by the international community for 
governmental institutions, political parties, civil organizations, and other organizations 
involved in planning and conducting the elections” (Kumar, 1998, p. 6).  These 
definitions bridge several concepts within this thesis.  The understanding of international 
actors is critical in defining criteria for defining a successful post-conflict environment 
and Kumar’s distinction separating the actors from the act of election assistance offers a 
deeper understanding of this agreed critical concept.  For instance, most post-conflict 
countries lack the infrastructure and resources for the technical part of elections such as 
ballot production and distribution, counting, and reporting -- what Kumar defines as 
election assistance.  It is easier to justify and commit the support from international actors 
when the assistance is necessary and quantifiable.   
 Kumar concludes that, “international electoral assistance is essential” (Kumar, 
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1998, p. 171).  His research concludes that without substantial international financial, 
technical, and political assistance post-conflict elections cannot be held.  Kumar admits 
his research did leave vital questions unanswered but offers them as suggestions for 
future research.  Within his case studies he identified the following unanswered 
questions:  “What conditions must exist before elections are held?  What can be done to 
consolidate peace and promote democracy if elections do not appear advisable in the 
immediate future?” (Kumar, 1998, p. 234).  These research gaps are used in developing 
and defining the focus of this thesis.   
Democracy and Elections in Africa by Staffan Lindberg is a “comparative study 
of democratization and the understanding of African politics” (Lindberg, 2006, p. i).  
Lindberg’s research provides evidence of the following: (1) elections improve the quality 
of democracy; (2) multiparty elections in a country instigate liberalization; (3) repetitive 
elections foster the expansion and deepening of democratic qualities.  Furthermore, he 
declares, “by the second or third elections, regimes are highly likely to survive” 
(Lindberg, 2006, p. 3) implying that success can be achieved simply through repetition.  
In applying this success to regimes overall he is applying success to the “regulatory and 
institutional framework” (Lindberg, 2006, p. 6) of the government and not just the party 
in power.  His definition of regime and its use in his explanation of election success 
imply success not for the temporary party in government but for a lasting institution and 
system of government itself.      
 Lindberg’s work contains an impressive database with variables collected from 
232 African elections.  To obtain such a vast range of data, Lindberg defines elections in 
simple terms and includes all elections even those of low or problematic quality.  He 
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acknowledges many of the elections within the database “coexist with systematic abuse 
of human rights, the disenfranchisement of parts of the populations, and other very 
undemocratic practices” (Lindberg, 2006, p. 8).  This inclusion allows for a more 
complete research design and for the use of election data that may be regarded as 
perfectly acceptable by the standards of the country conducting the elections while not 
forcing them to answer to outside standards.  Research contained within this thesis is 
similarly restricted and measured to quantifiable operational standards and not compared 
to any perceptions of democracy.    
 Although not part of his research variables, Lindberg discusses two other subjects 
of interest.  First, although not proved by his research, Lindberg hypothesizes that 
liberalization must occur first and then it is followed by elections.  He claims “decisions 
by ruling elites to instigate elections have [shown] results in political openings, increased 
civil liberties, and societal pressures” (Lindberg, 2006, p. 19).  Finally, Lindberg adds 
research on the effects of Islam and democracy.  His research concludes that “Islam 
seems to have no significant negative effects on democratization in Africa” (Lindberg, 
2006, p. 19).  This concept, neither central in Lindberg’s work nor in this thesis, is an 
item of interest as it does relate to current US democracy promotion efforts.   
Lindberg’s research is strengthened through a very detailed database and research 
methodology.  Still, at times the research seems overly optimistic and simplistic.  The 
concept that elections themselves are the greatest predictor of future success in 
democracy is well developed but not entirely conclusive.   
Wars, Guns, and Votes:  Democracy in Dangerous Places, by Paul Collier looks 
at democratic elections in post-conflict countries as power struggles.  It focuses on what 
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the author refers to as the bottom billion, referring to the lowest income areas/individuals 
which are usually associated with post-conflict elections and attempts at democratization.  
Its overall assessment starts out optimistic:  “Democracy is spreading and the world is 
safer” (Collier, 2009, p. 5).  It goes on to claim that “Where people have recourse to the 
ballot they do not resort to the gun” (Collier, 2009, p. 5).  The author quickly admits this 
concept is too simplistic.  He recognizes the growing international tendency to believe 
that democracy is the answer to political violence.  He argues that “the peace-promoting 
benefits of democracy have become one of the fundamental certainties of the political 
world” (Collier, 2009, p. 19).  Collier finds that although this is an internationally agreed 
upon concept, he has not seen sufficient academic research to back up the claim.  Collier 
attempts to provide this academic backing through his research. 
 His original findings demonstrate no definitive relationship between peace and 
democracy.  Collier said this “non-result seemed intrinsically unlikely” (Collier, 2009, p. 
20) so he considered other possible influencing variables, including economic 
development.  When he added an economic development variable, his research concluded 
there was a relationship.  His controversial research found evidence that “in countries that 
were at least middle-income levels, democracy systemically reduced the risk of political 
violence”, and he claims his research found that “in low-income countries, democracy 
made the society more dangerous” (Collier, 2009, p. 20).  Collier’s research defines the 
exact pinpoint threshold where this change occurs which is “$2,700 per capita per year, 
or around $7 per person per day” (Collier, 2009, p. 21). 
 Collier’s research examines other concepts such as political violence, ethnic 
divisions, and regime change and coups.  Here his findings and discussions are more 
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consistent with traditional research.  He focuses on international involvement and argues 
that the international community no longer supports democracy by force where perceived 
high-income countries enter a conflict area and implement democracy through military 
might.  Yet Collier does not discount the need for international assistance or military 
intervention, which he asserts “if properly constrained, has an essential role, providing 
both the security and the accountability of government to citizens that are essential for 
development” (Collier, 2009, p. 10).  Collier’s blanket endorsement for military 
intervention in the poorest countries is not widely accepted.  Wealthy nations conducting 
military intervention in poor countries raises fears of masked imperialism and hidden 
agendas.  History offers examples including western involvement in Africa that resulted 
in the slave trade and ethnic conflict of which remains today.  More recent examples 
include the US intervention in Somalia which resulted in 18 US soldiers and over 300 
Somalis killed in Mogadishu (Hoffman, 2003) and a subsequent withdrawal that is often 
judged as more as a retreat.  Critics of Collier’s support for military action also warn that 
the presence of military forces impedes humanitarian aid because recipients are 
concerned about hidden military agendas covered as assistance.  In the critique Foreign 
Aid Goes Military! William Easterly cites examples in Darfur, Somalia, Kosovo, and 
Afghanistan where military intervention fatally compromised the neutrality of 
humanitarian workers putting both the workers and their mission in danger and restricting 
access to the population they are attempting to assist (Easterly, 2008). 
Collier’s research notes that international assistance provides needed 
“accountability and security …which without a country cannot develop” (Collier, 2009, 
p. 189).  He says this is even more critical in the bottom billion as they are often unable 
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to provide the goods and services needed to sustain a population.  Collier claims the 
bottom billion are “too large to be nations, and too small to be states…because they lack 
the cohesion needed for collective action… [and] because they lack the scale needed to 
produce public goods efficiently” (Collier, 2009, p. 9).  Once again, Collier 
oversimplifies a broad ranging concept.  He attempts to cover the entire bottom billion 
under the umbrella of too large to be nations and too small to be states which is obviously 
a gross oversimplification.   
 Wars, Guns, and Votes:  Democracy in Dangerous Places examines post-conflict 
democracy in terms consistent with other academic works.  It stands out for Collier’s use 
of economic principles.  His concept is supported and researched, yet it stopped short of 
proving definitively his conclusion and is weakened by the use of a pinpoint threshold 
and an overreliance on statistical analysis.  Easterly warns that Collier’s work “seems to 
offer statistical analysis as a replacement for political judgment, or perhaps gives 
scholarly cover for actions that the governments want to take anyway” (Easterly, 2008, p. 
5).  Additionally it is too precise and does not account for other broader variables such as 
ethnic diversity, the availability of resources or previous levels of violence.  Even if the 
reader agrees with his concept that “in low-income countries, democracy made the 
society more dangerous” (Collier, 2009, p. 20) he does not provide any evidence that low 
income was the cause, or as Easterly critiqued, “correlation does not equal causation” 
(Easterly, 2008, p. 5)  Aside from not accounting for other possible variables as a 
possible cause in cases where his threshold is accurate, he does not account for the 
inclusion of cases where it is not applicable.  In a review of Collier’s work, Peter 
Lawrence argues “if we take Collier’s figure of $2,700 nominal GDP per capita as the 
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threshold for a country to enter a virtuous development cycle, then nearly 3 billion fall 
beneath it” (Lawrence, 2010, p. 148). 
 Elections and the media in Post-Conflict Africa:  Votes and Voices for Peace by 
Marie-Soleil Frere is another look at democratic elections with post-conflict African 
countries as case studies.  This research looks at the process through the concept and 
involvement of the media.  Frere justifies and validates her research through the “intricate 
connections” worldwide between political pluralism and the media.   
 Frere’s research data looks at six initial post-conflict elections in African 
countries.  The specific election cases used are considered the final element in a complex 
building process imposed and conducted by the international community.  Both the 
elections and media are defined through what Frere refers to as the standards of free and 
fair journalism.  Frere’s concept of free and fair is defined using the standards set by Ross 
Howard “who identifies the following conditions for an election to be deemed 
democratic:  there must be a real choice between several contenders or parties, the 
candidates must be free to campaign on the issues of their choice; the electoral process 
must be organized and transparent; and the voters must be well informed” (Howard, 
2004, p. 5).   These standards are in line with the UN standards chosen for this thesis 
including the concepts of freedom to campaign for all political parties; accountability and 
openness of the electoral process to the competing parties and an acceptable electoral law 
(Ndulo & Lulo, 1996). Frere uses data which “was gathered mainly through field 
research and in numerous discussions with journalists from the local media” (Frere, 2011, 
p. 15).  The resulting work offers solid research on the challenges and importance of the 
media in post-conflict elections.  Additionally, although her research appears at times to 
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be overly optimistic, Frere also defines the challenges and acknowledges the realities of 
post-conflict countries.  Specifically, she concludes that post-conflict media is often 
“controlled, limited, supervised, endlessly reminded of its responsibilities, or simply 
neglected or stifled” (Frere, 2011, p. 250).  
 The research structure Frere chose was not a comparison of the six elections.  She 
instead chose to use the six different case studies to show the expansive role of the media 
and the contrasting environments in which they are expected to operate.  The end result is 
a research model that can be applied to other studies.  Many of her findings on the media 
are used in this thesis, including free and fair media and her warnings on controlled 
media.   
 In addition to the above-mentioned books, several smaller research papers have 
contributed to research in post-conflict elections.  Several smaller works have helped 
define the criteria for this research.  “Counterinsurgency and Democracy: Strategic 
Implications of the Iraqi Elections”, by Thomas Donnelly and Vance Serchuk, researches 
the relationship between security and election timing, relating it to Iraq in 2005.  At the 
time of its publication, Iraq was about to hold its first post-conflict elections which would 
not only determine Iraq’s ability to sustain democracy but would also choose the leaders 
responsible for creating the nation’s constitution.  Conditions in the region at the time of 
the elections were so violent and unstable that many called for the elections to be 
canceled or at least postponed claiming that security is needed before democracy can be 
attained.  Donnelly and Serchuk argue the elections should proceed because “it is not that 
peace and security must precede democracy-but rather, that democracy itself will help 
pave the way for peace and security” (Donnelly & Serchuk, 2005, p. 5).  The reasons for 
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delaying or canceling the elections are acknowledged and explained.  The authors agree 
that security concerns are valid but argue that they will not be solved by withholding 
elections.  Donnelly and Serchuk argue that “rather than insist on the defeat of Iraqi 
insurgency…as a precondition for Iraqi democracy” it is through “democracy itself” that 
insurgency will be defeated.   They conclude that democracy “is not only the end, but 
also the means, of the global war on terror” (Donnelly & Serchuk, 2005, p. 2).  
“Counterinsurgency and Democracy: Strategic Implications of the Iraqi Elections” offers 
a short and concise argument concluding that democracy cannot wait for peace because it 
is through democracy that peace will be achieved.  This conclusion is consistent with 
Lindberg’s findings that through repetition, democracy itself will lead to successful 
democracy.  It is also provides insight for this thesis as it relates to the existence of 
critical infrastructure.  Securing the population is one of the most basic functions of 
government and part of critical infrastructure.  Donnelly and Serchuk argue that post-
conflict elections can take place in the absence of security possibly negating critical 
infrastructure as a necessary criterion.   
“Elections in Sudan: Chaos before Stability” by Savo Heleta examines the 
relationship between peace and elections with Sudan as a case study.  He disagrees with 
the assumption that peace can be reached through democracy and concludes that 
“elections would not lead to pluralism and democracy but rather instability, further 
polarization, and post-election chaos” (Heleta, 2010, p. 1).  To prove his argument Heleta 
uses elections in Sudan which he says have not led to stability but instead an environment 
“of human rights violations, extreme violence, and state and political corruption” (Heleta, 
2010, p. 7).  
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Heleta uses Sudan’s experience with Omar al Bashir to explain the political 
situation.  In 1989 Omar al Bashir and the ruling National Congress Party, (then known 
as the National Islamic Front) took control of Sudan in a military coup.  Bashir set up a 
strict code of security laws “giving ultimate power over all aspects of human life, 
welfare, discipline and punishment” (Heleta, 2010, p. 3) to himself and his regime.  “In 
2009, the International Criminal Court issued an arrest warrant for Bashir for alleged war 
crimes and crimes against humanity committed in Darfur” (Heleta, 2010, p. 3).  If Bashir 
lost the election he risked losing his self appointed powers and potentially going to jail 
for war crimes.  Heleta uses this example to prove that in this situation, free and fair 
elections are impossible.  He said what is more likely to happen is a fixed election that 
would give a thin veneer of democratic legitimacy to a war criminal (Heleta, 2010).  
“Elections in Sudan: Chaos Before Stability” explains exactly what critics of DPT warn, 
that is elections are destabilizing and capable of putting dangerous leaders in power.  
Heleta’s argument is also consistent with Fareed Zakaria’s argument that democratic 
elections often produce powerful leaders rather than good leaders (Zakaria, 1997).   
Heleta concludes with the dismal observation that “since the 1956 independence, 
Sudan has held a number of elections, but no multi-party election has ever produced a 
stable government” (Heleta, 2010, p. 7).  He does not believe that Sudan can hold free 
and fair elections and warns that holding elections will only lead to further instability.  
Although some issues he cited were very specific to Sudan and its 2010 election, he 
advances several criteria that can be applied elsewhere to determine if a nation is 
prepared to hold elections.  Specifically, he cites the need for security, transportation, 
communication, literacy and voter education and freedom of speech and assembly 
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(Heleta, 2010, p. 5).  Heleta’s argument that Sudan is not capable of conducting 
successful post-conflict elections is in part due to the absence of the above mentioned 
criteria.  Elections could thus potentially prove their validity not through success but in 
the failure of Sudan.  These concepts are used in this thesis to help build the foundation 
for the criterion involving existence of critical social infrastructure.   
“Post-conflict Elections:  War Termination, Democratization, and Demilitarizing 
Politics” by Terrence Lyons, focuses on the “instrument of post-conflict elections in 
cases where elections served to implement a peace agreement following a period of civil 
war” (Lyons, 2002, p. 3).  It includes six case studies in order to examine the relationship 
between peace agreements and post-conflict elections.  Lyons says these elections “are 
designed to advance two distinct but interrelated goals – war termination and 
democratization” (Lyons, 2002, p. 5).  Lyons defines the post-conflict election process 
through three key concepts:  conflict resolution (war termination); political transition 
(democratization); and demilitarizing politics (elections).  Lyons argues post-conflict 
elections are a way to legitimize leadership and allow for the exchange of military power 
for political power.  He warns that post-conflict environments make elections difficult 
and are often dangerous including “societal disorder, general insecurity, fear, distrust, and 
institutional breakdown” (Lyons, 2002, p. 6).  Even in such environments, elections are 
conducted because of the importance placed on their success.  Often the total weight of 
the security/peace agreement is placed solely upon these elections and “in some cases the 
vote is expected to do the impossible:  Elections cannot settle a military conflict that 
negotiations or victory have failed to end” (Lyons, 2002, p. 6). 
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Lyons also defines the challenge of establishing political and social order.  “It is 
during these interims that war-torn societies initiate the lengthy struggle to construct 
legitimate political institutions, demobilize soldiers and resettle displaced populations, 
come to terms with past human-rights abuses and institutionalize rule of law, and begin 
moving their economies from relief to development” (Lyons, 2002, p. 6).  Establishing 
this post-conflict political order is essential as the population (future voters) makes the 
critical decision to “support the peace process or return to war” (Lyons, 2002, p. 6). 
Lyons’s research examines the importance that preexisting political institutions 
and legacy norms play in reconstructing political order.  He looks at previous research 
which concludes that new actors in developing political institutions tend to follow 
preexisting paths and rely on norms set by previous regimes.  This research provides a 
dismal prediction as it relates to post-conflict countries where the old regimes were 
forcefully removed from power, but Lyons uses this to stress the importance of 
transitional leadership.  “Transitional arrangements that focus on joint decision-making 
process, confidence building among the former combatants, and the development of new 
norms can promote the demilitarization of politics and increase the chances that post-
conflict elections will result in sustainable transitions” (Lyons, 2002, p. 10).  Lyons 
believes that post-conflict leadership is usually found from within the conflict.  “In the 
aftermath of civil war, political and social organizations generally are absent” (Lyons, 
2002, p. 11) and therefore leadership is usually found as a result of the transformation of 
military power into political influence.  Determining who will provide successful, 
transitional, post-conflict leadership is often difficult since it is difficult to assess the 
actual political influence of military power.  Powerful military and militia leaders, who 
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enjoyed the support of the people in times of insecurity and conflict, often lack popular 
support in times of peace and “the extent to which they are capable of representing 
significant civilian constituencies in peacetime may be unknown” (Lyons, 2002, p. 11).  
Yet, in spite of this, he finds that the organizations and militias who were powerful in war 
are likely to “dominate and win” (Lyons, 2002, p. 11) post-conflict elections.  
Individuals, once thought by the international community to be war criminals, will be 
seen as able to protect the public if security risks are not properly mitigated.  Getting 
former militants to exchange military power for political benefits is crucial in the 
demilitarization process.  Turning militias and military organizations into political parties 
will force leaders into cooperation and political compromise, increasing the chances for 
lasting peace.    
Although the focus of Lyons’s research is not on the preconditions for successful 
post-conflict elections his research is very useful in understanding post-conflict elections.  
His concepts of developing militias into political parties, the creation of new institutional 
norms, managing post-conflict security, and ensuring voter confidence through 
proportional representation are all valuable in studying post-conflict elections.   His 
concept of transferring military power into political power helps justify the inclusion of 
the criterion involving reintegration of former combatants.   
 “Elections in Post-conflict Environments: The Role of International 
Organizations” by Dileepan Sivapathasumdaram asks two questions “(1) whether 
elections result in an end to hostilities and the establishment of an environment conducive 
to economic, political, and social rehabiliation and reconstruction” and “(2) what is the 
role of international organizations in ensuring the success of post-conflict elections”  
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(Sivapathasundaram, 2004, p. 5).  To answer these questions he starts by defining two 
key concepts:  post-conflict environments and international organizations.  Interestingly, 
he narrows the definition of post-conflict environments to “the aftermath of violent 
internal conflict” (Sivapathasundaram, 2004, p. 10).  This time starts when one side 
definitively wins or, as we see more often, in “the signing of a peace accord” 
(Sivapathasundaram, 2004, p. 10).  This period lasts from the end of the violence through 
the reestablishment of security and political institutions.  It is during this period in the 
post-conflict environment that post-conflict elections take place.  In defining post-conflict 
elections, he narrows it down to only “the first national or regional elections held 
following a conflict” (Sivapathasundaram, 2004, p. 11).  His defined parameters of post-
conflict environment are of interest for what they omit rather than what they include.  For 
instance, Iraq (2010) could be excluded based on the lack of a decisive winner and the 
concept of external aggression rather than internal conflict.  Additionally, BiH was far 
removed from his time restrictions and would also be excluded.  Conversely, his 
definition of international organizations is less narrow.  International organizations are 
considered both as governmental and nongovernmental organizations.  He broadly uses 
the term to encompass the community of actors involved in restructuring post-conflict 
countries regardless of their objectives or strategies making it much more inclusive and 
applicable – if also much more vague, nebulous and imprecise.   
Sivapathasundaram’s research asks how international actors can actually ensure 
that their efforts will be effective, specifically in conducting post-conflict elections.  This 
is an important question and one that this thesis is particularly interested in.  
Unfortunately, he immediately offers the conclusion that “the answer to this question is 
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not easily apparent nor can it be expounded in a single hypothesis or theory” 
(Sivapathasundaram, 2004, p. 12).  Furthermore, although for his research he uses a 
single definition for post-conflict environments, he admits there are no two which are 
alike.  He argues the differences in the environments leads researchers to conclude that 
what worked in one place may not be applicable to all cases and that this diversity is one 
of the biggest limitations of the research provided.  This research also looks at the 
“demobilization and reintegration of ex-combatants into civilian society” 
(Sivapathasundaram, 2004, p. 16).  His research is consistent with Lyons’s finding that 
former military leaders cannot be ignored and that in order to achieve lasting peace and 
political order it is necessary to transition these former combatants into political actors.   
Sivapathasundaram also researches the importance of independent media and its 
importance in post-conflict elections.  His research emphasizes the vital role that access 
to free, independent media has on voters.  Although several other researchers have looked 
at the effect that violence has on security conditions concerning other institutions, here he 
asks how post-conflict violence affects the media.  He finds that in post-confilct 
environments independent media is weakened and sometimes not available at all.  He 
includes differnet forms of media in his research and highlights the associated challenges 
such as the use of printed media or newspapers.  Such media is  usually only found in 
urban areas and even if available, it is limited to only the literate population.  
“Furthermore, in most cases the electronic media is controlled by the state. And ruling 
factions—accustomed to utilizing it to further their own objectives—find it difficult to 
relinquish control even after the transitional period has passed” (Sivapathasundaram, 
2004, p. 18).  These media challenges – the availability of media, its tailored use, and 
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state control are important in understanding the limitations and challenges of media in 
post-conflict environments.  They are used in this thesis particularly as they relate to print 
media and literacy.   
His research concludes by acknowledging that conditions in post-conflict 
environments “are hardly favorable for political reconstruction and reform” 
(Sivapathasundaram, 2004, p. 32).  He identifies the solution to political reconstruction 
and elections in the post-conflict environment as the involvement of international actors 
who assist in “security…demobilization and reintegration…developing/reforming 
political institutions and assisting in the emergence of an independent media” 
(Sivapathasundaram, 2004, p. 33).  He goes further to identify the need for long-term 
commitment from international actors in order to increase the likelihood of lasting peace 
and democratization.   Although he fails to incorporate or develop concepts such as 
military involvement/occupation and forced democracy, his research is valuable and his 
focus on international actors and the media are consistent with the findings of this thesis.   
 “Post-Conflict Elections:  Uncertain Turning Points in Transitions” by Benjamin 
Reilly focuses on peace agreements containing timetables for democratic elections.  He 
starts by acknowledging previous research and the twin goals of post-conflict elections:  
war termination and democratization. Additionally, he agrees with research on the 
contradictory relationship between these goals.  Reilly chooses not to further examine 
this concept but instead “addresses some of the core dilemmas confronted in post-conflict 
elections that flow from these multiple and sometimes contradictory goals” (Reilly, 2008, 
p. 4).  His research is ultimately designed to define the conditions under which elections 
will help terminate war and promote democracy.    
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 This concept of inherent tensions between competitive elections and conflict 
management occurs consistently in post-conflict elections research.  By its general 
nature, democracy is a competition with winners and losers and therefore is a form of 
conflict.  Reilly’s research describes how “democratization by its very nature undermines 
established political orders, provides a pathway for new entrants to access the political 
system, highlights social cleavages, subverts existing power relations, and threatens 
incumbent authority” (Reilly, 2008, p. 7) and he concludes that “transitions to democracy 
in general and competitive elections in particular have the potential to be deeply 
destabilizing events” (Reilly, 2008, p. 7).  Reilly also describes how, despite the tensions 
and competition associated with elections, the international community continues to use 
elections as a solution to conflict, consistent with DPT.  Reilly accepts DPT as it relates 
to existing democracies, but he finds that “countries undergoing the wrenching process of 
democratization are neither” less prone to large-scale conflict nor less likely to go to war 
with each other (Reilly, 2006, p.9).  These fragile states are historically more prone to 
return to conflict.   
Reilly’s research does not disagree with previous research concluding that 
international actors are vitally important to the peace process in post-conflict countries, 
but says what is less definite is when this support should stop.  Since the timing of the 
elections usually signals the start of international withdrawal, avoiding premature 
elections is directly related to the chances that the peace process will be successful.  At 
the same time, there is pressure to hold elections to legitimize the new peaceful state both 
internally and internationally.  Reilly finds that managing the goals of legitimizing the 
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state and giving it sovereignty are often in competition with the needs of security which 
the international community provides. 
Reilly concludes that transitional elections are “saddled with unrealistic 
expectations, and expected to achieve inconsistent and sometimes incompatible goals” 
(Reilly, 2008, p. 32).  His research explores what Sivapathasundaram’s did not, forced 
democracy and its chances of failing.  Along with DPT, Reilly argues that post-conflict 
democratization is in part due to “the ideologcally-driven belief that all good things go 
together” (Reilly, 2008, p. 31).  He argues that using democratic elections to solve 
conflict is fundamentally contradictory to democracy’s competitive nature and 
reintegeration can actually put “the same characters who started or fought the conflict” 
(Reilly, 2008, p. 31) into elected positions.  Yet he still acknowledges “elections have 
become a standard part of the prescription of contemporary peace-building” (Reilly, 
2008, p. 31).  He therefore concludes that if elections are going to continue to be used in 
post-conflict peace-building then they need to be conducted and evaluated within the 
reality of the challenges they pose.   
“The Dilemmas of Statebuilding: Confronting the Contradictions of Post War 
Peace Operations” by Roland Paris and Timothy Sisk researches the role of post-conflict 
elections in international efforts to assist with terminating conflicts and establishing 
peace.  It starts by acknowledging the familiar post-conflict cycle:  conflicts end in 
settlement, and are followed by the transitional path of interim government, some form of 
constitution creation, and finally an election.   As in other research, he agrees the post-
conflict election is deemed to be the most important part of this process and has the 
potential to make or break the peace agreement.  This research specifically looks at the 
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initial electoral process through a comparison of the four cases of Cambodia, South 
Africa, Afghanistan, and Liberia (Paris & Sisk, 2009, p. 196).  All four cases involved 
assistance from international actors including the United Nations.  His research finds that 
“electoral processes are necessary in moving beyond civil war, but path dependence 
maters.  Sequencing, design, and the extent of international oversight are the key 
variables in explaining the degree to which electoral processes contribute to capable, 
responsive states and to other alternatives such as captured, fragmented, or weak states” 
(Paris & Sisk, 2009, p. 201). 
 The importance of the international community is assumed rather than debated.  
They argue that the international community must acknowledge and overcome the 
dilemmas and security concerns associated with elections in order to establish the 
legitimacy needed to maintain peace.  It concludes with the warning that anything less 
potentially sets the conditions for relapses into violence and conflict.  Once he concludes 
that international actors are necessary for successful post-conflict elections he then asks 
the question of “how and how long they will stay engaged once the first election is 
passed” (Paris & Sisk, 2009, p. 201). 
 Regarding the issue of timing, Paris and Sisk examine the familiar question of 
state building first or democracy first.  The state building argument is that “state building 
should come first, putting into place viable structure of authority to provide basic security 
and enhancing service-delivery capacities and economic revival before electoral 
competition takes place” (Paris & Sisk, 2009, p. 197).   The opposing school of thought is 
that the “election processes are the critical turning point that ends an uncertain, and 
usually turbulent, transition period and may in fact be the key ingredient in moving 
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beyond the vulnerabilities of post-war settings to ongoing political violence” (Paris & 
Sisk, 2009, p.200).  In sum, they quote Pauline Baker, “the former see peace as a 
precondition for democracy, the later see democracy as a precondition for peace.”  
Although Sisk falls short of siding with either argument, he more importantly concludes 
“that the transitional processes—which culminate in elections—are not the end point of 
peace building” (Paris & Sisk, 2009, p.199). 
 Paris and Sisk agree that each individual election is different, but this research 
highlights common challenges that the international community has been systematically 
unable to overcome.  It asks “what are the minimal conditions necessary for a “good” 
election in high-conflict settings, one that produces a legitimate, stable, and effective 
government that can make progress toward social goals of human development, human 
security, and social reconciliation” (Paris & Sisk, 2009, p.201).  Also it confronts the 
basic dilemma of post-conflict elections: “can a government created in a process that is 
essentially conflictual lead [sic] a society in a manner that prevents, manages, or 
transforms social conflict” (Paris & Sisk, 2009, p. 201). 
 It is concluded with a powerful finding that “elections—for better or for worse—
are an essential step in the process of reconstituting political order after civil war, despite 
the clear and evident risks they impose for re-igniting violent conflict in the heart and 
passion of the contest for power” (Paris & Sisk, 2009, p.217).  Although there will 
always be reasons to delay the elections, waiting for the perfect environment is just not 
possible and concludes that “practical political imperatives demand faster action” (Paris 
& Sisk, 2009, p.206).  Although it recaps the previously mentioned variables, it 
concludes that the “most important variables in the viability of elections are the provision 
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of security (usually, but not always, by external forces) and the extent of inclusivity in 
electoral outcomes” (Paris & Sisk, 2009, p. 214).  Finally, they take a stance on the 
question of security and elections and conclude that this research “gives strong credence 
to the overall finding that security must precede electoral events, not follow them” (Paris 
& Sisk, 2009, p. 214).  
V. Conclusion 
 Previous research on post-conflict elections varies with the elections themselves.  
Several researchers have attempted to define the criteria for successful elections in order 
to better predict success.  The resulting research, although unique by elections studied 
and research method applies, highlights similar criteria and measures of success.  
Specifically, most research accepts the following as required criteria for successful 
elections in post-conflict environments:  the existence of critical social infrastructure; the 
involvement of international actors; the reintegration of former militant actors; and access 
to free and fair media.  From previous research, these criteria are carried over in to this 
thesis which now turns to its specific case studies.  
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Chapter Three 
Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF), the US-led coalition war in Iraq, started on March 
20, 2003 and lasted through 2011 when the final US combat forces left the country.  In 
that time Saddam Hussein was removed from power, tried and executed and replaced by 
a democratically elected government.   
Four countries and nearly 200,000 troops were part of the initial invasion, the 
United States (148,000), United Kingdom (45,000), Australia (2,000), and Poland (194) 
(Geocities).  In the immediate period following the invasion, 34 countries and over 
300,000 soldiers joined OIF and formed what was known as Multi-National Forces Iraq 
(MNFI).  In addition to combat troops, several international assistance organizations were 
in Iraq, including 1,090 assistance personnel from the United Nations Assistance Mission 
for Iraq (UNAMI).  In January 2010, the final coalition forces left Iraq, and MNFI 
became US Forces Iraq (USFI) as only US forces remained.  In 2010, there were just over 
88,000 US troops remaining in Iraq.   
Iraq’s recent political history has included a class of ruling elites and British 
imperial patrons.  Ethnic divides and internal tensions among the Iraqi population 
eventually drove the British to attempt to create a form of law to appease what was 
perceived as restless indigenous peoples and to ensure the safety of political and 
economic interests in the area.  Although the resulting government was largely an 
imperial puppet, it did create a constitution and introduced concepts “such as the rule of 
law, civil liberties, competitive elections, the guaranteeing of minority and other 
communal rights … [which] would be incorporated into the body politic through 
constitutional design” (Dawisha, 2009, p. 5).  What resulted resembled a constitutional 
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monarchy, albeit very much in its infancy.  Between 1921 and 1958, Iraq experienced 
“periods of democratic attitudes and practices…political pluralism and experience with 
representative political institutions” (Dawisha, 2005, p. 11).   
In these years there was still political and social unrest and the king was 
eventually forcibly removed from power.  Following the removal of the king, there were 
two elections, however both were regarded as fraudulent and considered to be 
manipulated by the ruling elite.  Between 1958 and 1979 several military regimes were in 
and out of power until the international community intervened and Saddam Hussein 
assumed power.  At this time Iraq once again experienced questionable democracy with 
Saddam Hussein holding occasional one sided elections.  Although Saddam Hussein was 
elected in following years it was through fraudulent and corrupt proceedings documented 
in reports of opponents being imprisoned, tortured, or killed.   
 Following the removal and trial of Saddam Hussein, several elections were 
mandated, conducted, and policed by the international community and occupying military 
forces.  The 2010 Iraqi election was the second national level election conducted after the 
start of the 2003 conflict.   
I. Defining Successful Elections  
Iraq is a parliamentary democracy where voters choose candidates for the Council 
of Representatives and the Council of Representatives chooses the prime minister.  In the 
2010 Iraqi Parliamentary Election 60.67 percent of the 18.9 million registered voters 
choose candidates for the 325 member Council of Representatives in a proportional 
representative voting system.  The members of the Council of Representatives choose the 
prime minster from three main parties:  al-Iraqiyya, State of Law Coalition, and the 
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National Iraqi Alliance.  The candidates were Ayad Allawi (al-Iraqiyya), Norui al-Maliki 
(State of Law Coalition), and Ibrahim al-Jaafari (National Iraqi Alliance).  The final 
result elected Ayad Allawi prime minister of Iraq.   
 The Iraqi constitution sets the criteria for voting in Iraq.  It requires the voter be: 
an Iraqi citizen, legally competent, at least 18 years old in the month in which elections 
are held, and registered to vote in accordance with the procedures established by the 
Independent High Electoral Commission of Iraq (IHEC).  Voting is unrestricted outside 
of these criteria and is voluntary.  National level voter education programs were in place 
and voter education was conducted with assistance from IHEC, governmental and non-
governmental organizations, and political parties and candidates.  “No Iraqi citizen 
willing to embrace democracy, peace and development was left behind, including 
internally displaced persons, refugees in neighboring countries, hospitalized patients, 
detainees, the Iraqi Security Forces and the Iraqi Diaspora” (UNAMI, 2010, p.3).   As a 
result, in 2010 voters in Iraq and Iraqis displaced in 16 other countries voted in the 
national election.  
According to the UN, “thousands of candidates campaigned intensely across the 
country for 325 seats in the new parliament, despite continued violence” (UNAMI, 2010, 
p. 4).  Campaigning was conducted at unprecedented levels in all forms of media.  
Television and radio campaign ads educated voters on both the candidates and the 
democratic process.  Print media was also used and billboards, posters, and campaign 
banners were displayed throughout Iraq.  Voter education teams were established and 
traveled throughout the country to ensure those receiving campaign media understood the 
process and translation units ensured voting and educational materials were translated 
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and available in multiple languages.  Overall, campaigning was transparent and open to 
all candidates.  
 With security still a concern, IHEC was cognizant of voters’ fears and worked to 
secure the population.  IHEC established and publically released new security measures 
designed to ensure the secrecy of the voting process and the safety of the voters.  
Restrictions ensured ballots were not marked in a way that could identify the voter.  For 
displaced Iraqis voting abroad, regulations prohibited any identifying markings such as 
signatures or stamps.  The additional security measures did not stop with just the ballot.  
“Once the voting was done, counting of what was in the sealed ballot boxes went forward 
(by hand) to thousands of counting centers under the scrutiny of observers and media 
representatives” (Dawisha, 2009, p. 35).  Voters were assured in the most transparent 
way possible that their vote would be protected and secured throughout the election 
process.   
Several safeguards were in place to ensure reasonable speed in the counting of 
ballots.  Voters were informed of the counting process and assured that ballot counting 
took place immediately after the polls closed.  IHEC understood that any delay in 
counting, perceived or actual, would lead to accusations of fraud.  Therefore they took 
additional measures such as training and accrediting 122 international observers, 18,052 
national observers, and 23,015 party agents (UNAMI, 2010) in order to ensure the count 
remained as transparent and efficient as possible.  The result was a reasonably quick 
counting of the ballots and release of information.  The final count was recorded and 
released about a month later, although quickly followed by a recount due to allegations of 
fraud.  Even so, the recount was quickly conducted and confirmed the original results.  
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This validated both the process and the results, ensuring the voters were reasonably 
satisfied with the speed by which their votes were counted and reported.   
The 2010 election was not completely without incident.  “Following the 
announcement of the results by IHEC, more than 300 appeals on the preliminary results 
were submitted” (UNAMI, 2010, p. 4).  Initially, the large number of appeals caused 
grave concern among Iraqi voters, candidates, and international observers.  The appeals 
were processed with speed and transparency and the recount quickly reassured all 
doubting parties.  According to the UN, “the highly professional manner in which the 
IHEC conducted the recount confirmed the proper conduct of the entire election” 
(UNAMI, 2010, p. 4). The overall transparency of the 2010 election installed a sense of 
legitimacy for both voters and political candidates. 
 January 16, 2010 was the original election date according to constitutional 
mandate.  This date was postponed because of concerns regarding the election laws.  The 
delay immediately caused panic within the international community.  It was considered a 
warning that support for the constitution was weakening and democracy would fail.  
Additionally, a delay was seen as an obstruction to the US forces’ withdrawal timeline.  
The cause of the delay included the choice of electoral systems, changing the number of 
electoral districts, minority seat distribution, the mandatory inclusion of women, 
determining the population eligible to vote, accounting for growth, and the participation 
of Iraq’s Kurdish minority.  In 2010 the Kurdish voting population was growing in 
number and international influence.  The growth alone caused concern they could sway 
the election depending on who would be eligible to vote and where they could vote.  
Debate continued well after the elections were delayed, but it proved both democratic and 
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effective: compromise was reached and amendments were passed.  At this time, the 
international community appeared confident that the election would be conducted and 
that Iraqi democracy was no longer in jeopardy.  Iraq’s amended laws were seen as fair, 
transparent, and above all created by and for the Iraqi people.   
II. Defining Successful Post-conflict Elections  
 Defining the post-conflict period is a difficult process. The definition can be as 
vague as when fighting ends or as complex as to include third party negotiations and 
international treaties.  Previous research describes the conflict environment in terms of a 
cycle.  The first part is internal conflict, followed by intervening international actors, then 
a peace agreement usually created by the intervening international actors, transitional 
emplaced leadership, and the critical final step of democratic elections.  Ideally, this part 
signifies the return of power to the people and the definitive end to the conflict.   
 However, the Iraq conflict did not fall neatly into this cycle.  The first step in 
Iraq’s conflict cycle was the ousting of the existing political regime by an external 
coalition of international actors.  Rather than installing temporary leadership after the 
removal of Saddam Husain, “the Bush administration opted for a coalition to become an 
occupying power in order to accelerate the transition away from Saddam Hussein’s 
dictatorship” (Khalilzad, 2010, p. 43).  After the Coalition Provisional Authority was 
established, the existing government infrastructure was dismantled, including the 
disarming of the military.  What remained was a total void of government, military, and 
security infrastructure including vital associated jobs.   The end result was that a “large 
number of people saw no place for themselves in this new order” (Khalilzad, 2010, p. 
43).  A majority of those who did not see themselves as belonging to or believing in the 
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new government were military aged males, making them a dangerous target recruiting 
group for insurgents.  Soon this large group of unemployed and disassociated youth was 
recruited by the insurgent forces and was able to operate unrestricted in the absence of 
military or security forces.  Iraq grew increasingly hostile and violent until reaching the 
point of civil war.   
These turbulent circumstances occurred in 2005 in tandem with Iraq’s first 
national elections.  The election mandate was driven by the coalition’s post-conflict 
timeline. Iraq had not seen the end of violence or the emergence of a clear winner and the 
environment was still immersed in conflict.  As a result, “the first election in January 
2005 failed to achieve broad-based participation, resulting in polarized sectarian 
violence” (Khalilzad, 2010, p. 45).   
Still by 2010, Iraq did not follow the traditional post-conflict cycle and it failed to 
demonstrate several of the criteria for successful post-conflict elections.  The complete 
set of post-conflict criteria, including the existence of critical social infrastructure, 
involvement of international actors, reintegration of former militant actors, and access to 
free and fair media were arguably not in place during the 2010 Iraqi election.  The 
existence of critical infrastructure in post-conflict Iraq was unique to this conflict.  Prior 
to the conflict Iraq “had powerful institutions, including a strong national army” 
(Khalilzad, 2010, p. 43).  As noted above, after the conflict started, the interim coalition 
leadership dismantled the existing government and security infrastructure.  In terms of 
basic infrastructure, prior to the war the estimated average hours of electricity per day in 
Baghdad were 16-24 hours. Following the invasion in May of 2003, it was reduced to 
only 4-8 hours, and in 2010 it remained at only 15.5 hours (O'Hanlon & Livingston, 
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2010, p. 30).  In a survey of the estimated availability of essential services conducted 
prior to the 2010 election, approximately only 20 percent of Iraqis had access to 
sanitation, 45 percent access to water, 30 percent to public health services, and only 50 
percent had access to adequate housing (O'Hanlon & Livingston, 2010, p. 33).   
The absence of such critical infrastructure and government institutions is believed 
to be a precursor for democratic and election failure.  In Elections as Milestones and 
Stumbling Blocks for Peaceful Democratic Consolidation, Jack Snyder concludes that 
failure to build critical infrastructure prior to elections “is precisely why democratization 
may often go awry, as occurred in recent elections in the Middle East” (Snyder, 2010, p. 
3).  In Iraq, rather than building critical infrastructure and then holding elections in 
accordance with post-conflict criteria, infrastructure was disbanded or destroyed prior to 
elections.   
International, external actors are often used to mediate and solve disputes in post-
conflict environments.  An interim peace is often the result of such outside influence and 
is usually accompanied by an installed interim leadership counsel. The new government 
and installed leadership “often face criticism and legitimacy is challenged” (Lyons, 2002, 
p. 6).  Additionally the legitimacy of any elections held at this time is also suspect.  The 
involvement of outside international actors can help to put a neutral legitimate face on the 
process, particularly if international non-governmental organizations which are widely 
viewed as impartial and acting without national or political agenda are involved.  In 2010, 
Iraq and the US-led military effort was losing support from the international community.  
A large percentage of the initial international involvement, military and non-
governmental, had already departed Iraq leaving behind a US-centric form of democracy 
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promotion that quickly lost any gained legitimacy and neutrality international 
organizations may have added.   
 Iraq in 2010 was once again not a normal case study.  By this time, international 
support for OIF was low.  Domestic political pressure caused many international leaders 
to formally withdraw from the war and on 1 January 2010 Multi National Forces Iraq 
(MNF-I) officially became United States Forces Iraq (USF-I).  This was a strong symbol 
from the international community demonstrating that the coalition was officially 
disbanded.  Although several non-governmental organizations remained in Iraq after 01 
January 2010, the exit of coalition forces brought about a significant withdrawal of 
international support.  
 Post-conflict research hypothesizes that leadership will be found from within the 
conflict itself.  “In the aftermath of civil war, political and social organizations generally 
are absent” (Lyons, 2002, p. 11) and therefore leadership is usually found as a result of 
transforming military power into political influence.  The involvement of previous 
militant actors in the post-conflict leadership structure is hypothesized to both remove a 
possible opponent of the peace process through political integration and install a proven 
leader.  It is difficult to predict the successful conversion of political influence from 
military power, especially in an insurgency.  Insurgent leaders, who through the use of 
fear and intimidation, are often able to exert control successfully in an environment of 
insecurity and conflict are either less powerful in post-conflict peace or will attempt to 
use the same strongman tactics in their political careers.  
 The 2010 Iraqi Parliament elected Ayad Allawi prime minister of Iraq.  Allawi 
“was a doctor practicing medicine in a British hospital and a member of one of Iraq's 
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prominent Shiite families. His father had been a doctor and member of parliament, and 
his grandfather had helped negotiate Iraq's independence from the British in the 1920s” 
(Ignatius, 2004).  His involvement in the conflict was not as a militant but in cooperation 
with the coalition and the new government.  Allawi was not a former combatant who 
traded military power for political power but rather an influential professional from an 
elitist patronage.   
In broader terms, Iraq still fails to demonstrate reintegration success.  “In Iraq, 
reintegration was a particularly important challenge, relating both to the armed forces of 
the disposed regime and to the Kurdish and Shia militias eager to play a role in the new 
political system” (Ucko, 2008, p. 341).  The coalition was hesitant to work with members 
of the former regime and was viewed as punishing former Iraqi military members.  
Reintegration efforts were hindered by the perception that both the coalition and the Iraqi 
government were more concerned with retribution then reintegration.  The result was not 
only the failure to reintegrate former fighters but “many … [also] felt spurned and turned 
against the militias, tribes and insurgents occupation.  These soldiers were not 
reintegrated as much as deliberately alienated.  With easy access to weapons, in a country 
awash with munitions, they mounted a potent threat to the US presence in Iraq and to its 
partners within the emerging government” (Ucko, 2008, pp. 343-344). The reintegration 
of militia members was complicated in part due to the lack of any clear winners or losers 
among them but also by the perceived or real foreign influence associated with many 
militias. “The menace of radical, Iranian-backed armed militias…offered a poor 
foundation to the transition and reintegration strategy and militated against the notion of 
an Iraqi government loyal to the state” (Ucko, 2008, p. 350).  Finally, reintegration failed 
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because of the lack of trust and certainty in the new Iraqi government.  “The reintegration 
process was undercut by a lack of goodwill” (Ucko, 2008, p. 349).  The new government 
could not provide guarantees of security or an influential role for former regime members 
or militia leaders.    
 Iraq fails to show evidence of successful reintegration of former combatants 
attributing to election success.  In fact, a March 2010 report on the progress of political 
benchmarks agreed upon between the Bush administration and the Iraqi government 
reported “no political progress thus far” (O'Hanlon & Livingston, 2010, p. 10).  By 2010, 
Iraqi insurgent groups had lost the support they experienced in 2005.  Both the Sunni 
supported al-Qaeda insurgency and the Shia Mahdai Army had lost legitimacy and their 
stronghold on the population.  The Iraqi population and the international community 
blamed the elected Iraqi leadership who they considered weak and ineffective against the 
insurgency.  Reintegration efforts failed to capitalize on this and instead the new 
government, voters, and the international community quickly assigned blame to the 
insurgency and tried to separate them from the developing democracy.  This is evident in 
the government’s response just prior to the 2010 election when government forces “dealt 
hard blows to armed militias in several locals” (Khalilzad, 2010, p. 43), resulting in 
improved security and the forceful removal of insurgents and their supporters.  Politically 
this effort was seen as to “both reinforce the agents of the state while tipping the balance 
away from the political and paramilitary groups that were its foes in this power struggle” 
(Dawisha, 2009, p. 28).  The forceful extraction of insurgent actors by legitimate 
government officials demonstrates Iraq’s extremely limited desire or efforts to integrate 
military combatants into the new government.   
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 Post-conflict election research generally supports an independent free media as a 
criterion needed for successful elections.  Most research acknowledges the challenges in 
post-conflict environments where independent media is often a causality of the conflict 
and rarely available.  Iraq offers an interesting case study because “after the fall of 
Baghdad on April 9, 2003, Iraq’s news media environment transformed almost overnight 
from the tightly controlled propaganda arm of Saddam Hussein’s rule into one of the 
most diverse and unrestricted news environments in the Middle East” (Amos, 2010, p. 2).  
One journalist described the dramatic transformation saying “we’ve moved from one 
newspaper and one radio to 1,500 outlets” (Amos, 2010, p. 8).  In the years following the 
media landscape continued to develop with help from international actors, private 
investors, and the new Iraqi government.  By 2010 the level of available media “was 
unprecedented in the history of the country and possibly in the region” (UNAMI, 2010, p. 
3).  Iraq had a well developed and mature media infrastructure.  “Hundreds of news 
papers, scores of television and radio stations operated with unprecedented levels of 
freedom.  Although poor security and threats of violence from militias and insurgents still 
challenge the media, state censorship was virtually absent” (Khalilzad, 2010, p. 43). 
 The 2010 elections also saw the emergence of new media platforms such as 
websites, blogs, SMS, and YouTube and other social media.  Pre-war internet subscriber 
levels were estimated at only 4,500 throughout Iraq. By 2010, this number rose to over 
1,600,000 (O'Hanlon & Livingston, 2010, p. 35).  Online campaigning went viral with 
the candidates of almost all major parties using social media.  Media efforts were not 
contained within Iraq.  Facebook quickly became “the leading social network service in 
Iraq” and ranked second in a survey of the top ten websites for news and information in 
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Iraq (Whitehouse & Johnston, 2011).  In 2010 there were over a million Facebook users 
in Iraq and they were using it for more than just socializing.  Facebook sites were set up 
in over half of the countries with displaced voters.  Freedom of the press merged with 
technology to give the 2010 election unprecedented levels of media coverage.   
 Although new media had an impact on voters, especially younger voters, 
television was the most available and widely used form of media.  A “research study on 
media usage, habits and attitudes of people over the age of 15, across Iraq” found 90 
percent of Iraqis used television for news and information and only 37 percent used radio 
and even less, 20 percent read news papers (Whitehouse & Johnston, 2011).  Television 
was popular prior to the 2003 invasion and following the removal of Saddam Hussein  
restrictions on satellite television were also removed.  Television viewing increased as 
did available channels and stations.  “In the early spring of 2010, Iraqis were captivated 
by their television screens, watching almost nonstop coverage of the parliamentary 
election campaign” (Amos, 2010, p. 2).  Television coverage included candidate 
campaigning, voter education messaging, safety information, and national elections 
news.  During the 2010 election on any “average day, nearly 16 million Iraqis are 
exposed to TV media” (Amos, 2010, p. 3) and election coverage dominated Iraqi 
television.   
 The rapid growth and use of television provided challenges in ensuring free and 
fair media coverage.   Some of the new media outlets were used as propaganda agents 
and their partisan agenda threatened “to widen the gap between communities and weaken 
the national identity” (Amos, 2010, p. 1).  As the media landscape grew, powerbrokers in 
the region realized the influence of ownership.  Quickly the media reflected the ethnic 
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and political divide in Iraq.  Bias was evident and Iraqis became distrustful of media.  
Still, with at least one television in every Iraqi home, Iraqis were watching television all 
be it with an air of suspicion. One Iraqi blogger voiced this suspicion and distrust 
comparing Iraqi media to Fox News, saying “they give away their political leanings 
immediately.  Just reading their election headlines looks like reading campaign spin of 
various coalitions” (Amos, 2010, p. 2).  Iraqi viewers choose to answer the obvious 
media bias the in the same way viewers around the world do, by watching several 
channels.  Many viewers report watching more than five channels daily, which means 
they are sampling multiple opinions across the sectarian divide…it is a survival skill” 
(Amos, 2010, p. 8).   
 Iraq demonstrated and exceeded traditional standards for free and fair media in a 
post-conflict election.  Media was readily available at all levels of the democratic 
process.  The election was transparent to voters through the use of television, radio, 
newspaper, internet and social media.  Results were reported rapidly throughout the 
country.  Media was available in multiple languages and throughout several other 
countries to include displaced Iraqis.  Election coverage ensured citizens living abroad 
and in refugee areas who would otherwise not have access to information could follow 
the elections.  And new interactive social media brought democracy to the new 
generation of Iraq who now were empowered not just in the voting booth but throughout 
the entire election process.  The media’s effect on the success of the 2010 Iraqi elections 
is evident and its effects demonstrate media’s importance as criteria for success in post-
conflict elections.   
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III. Conclusion 
This research concludes that the Iraqi 2010 election was successful per the criteria 
defined.  The election included the right of all voters to participate in the electoral process 
without hindrance, freedom to campaign for all political parties, secrecy of the ballot, 
reasonable speed in the counting of ballots, accountability and openness of the electoral 
process to the competing parties, and an acceptable electoral law.  Conversely, this 
research finds the 2010 Iraqi election did not demonstrate the presence of all criteria for 
successful post-conflict elections.  Critical social infrastructure was present prior to the 
conflict and disbanded only after the conflict started.  The involvement of international 
actors was significantly reduced prior to the 2010 elections.  Reintegration efforts all but 
stopped prior to elections and former combatants were forcefully removed.  Access to 
free and fair media was present and undeniably contributed to the success of the 2010 
Iraq election.   
This research started by asking if all criteria must be present or if in the absence 
or weakness of some, a strong presence of another can still achieve successful elections.  
Specifically, did the presence of a strong media outlet in Iraq lead to the success of the 
2010 elections?  This research argues, yes, the presence of a strong media in Iraq in 2010 
was able to influence the success of elections in the absence or weakness of other criteria 
such as minimum levels of basic infrastructure or successful reintegration.   
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Chapter Four 
From 1991 – 2002, Sierra Leone was engaged in civil war in which over 60,000 
people were killed, and a nation was subjected to “brutal tactics including murder, 
physical mutilation, rape, and the recruitment and abduction of child soldiers” (Reno, 
2012, p. 459) Additionally, the conflict resulted in the displacement of nearly half the 
population and the destruction of the nation’s infrastructure. 
 By 1999 the world saw Sierra Leone plunge into a bloody civil war.  The 
international community was pressured to react due to the horrific news coming out of 
Sierra Leone.  On 22 October 1999, the UN Security Council established the United 
Nations Assistance Mission in Sierra Leone. The UN Security Council authorized the 
assistance of a multinational collation including 17,500 military personnel.  In addition to 
the UN mission, the UK had military forces working with the UN.  The additional 
military augmentation entered the conflict following the rebel capture of “500 UN 
peacekeepers and their equipment” (Roberson, 2007, p. 4).  UK military forces opted to 
use only small specially trained teams rather than large operational forces such as in Iraq.  
This tactical decision is argued to have “led to final peace accords, restored order to a 
failed state, and allowed the democratic restoration of the government of Sierra Leone” 
(Roberson, 2007, p. 2).   
 The political and economic infrastructure in Sierra Leone prior to the war was 
weak and unstable.  A poverty profile conducted in 1989-1900 found over 80% of the 
population lived in poverty and suffered from lack of income, lack of access to health, 
education and other services, powerlessness, isolation, vulnerability, and social exclusion 
(Department of National Development and Economic Planning, 1990). The working poor 
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were largely small substance farmers.  The war displaced the agricultural population and 
destroyed the land resulting in the loss of crops vital to survival.  Additionally, the weak 
transportation system was also destroyed leaving many rural areas without access roads 
to urban areas.  Access to power and clean water was also damaged by the war.  The Iraq 
case study demonstrated an area where a viable infrastructure was destroyed by war but 
Sierra Leone is a case where an already weak and insufficient system was further 
depleted and destroyed.   
Sierra Leone is not new to democracy or elections.  Since 1961 there have been 
several national democratic elections, with the most recent previous post-conflict election 
conducted in 2002.  The 2007 election was notable as it was the first full election 
following the conclusion of the UN peacekeeping mission.  Additionally, it was the first 
election that would result in a post-conflict change of power.   
I. Defining Successful Elections  
The constitution of Sierra Leone guarantees citizens the right to vote.  “The 
constitution provides that every citizen of Sierra Leone who is 18 or more years of age 
and of sound mind has a right to vote in public elections and referenda” (Commonwealth 
Observation Group, 2007, p. 17).  In 2007, education campaigns were developed to 
ensure all citizens knew their right to vote and understood how to register and vote.  
National level voter education campaigns specifically focused on the challenges such as 
“high levels of poverty and correspondingly low literacy rates, as well as the country’s 
youthful demographics” (NDI, 2008, p. 17).  Voter education outreach projects used all 
forms of media to reach as many voters as possible.  This included the use of traditional 
methods such as billboards, radio ads, and flyers, as well as smaller localized efforts such 
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as community rallies and neighborhood meetings.  The education campaign was 
successful.  “2.6 million Sierra Leoneans (an estimated 90 percent of eligible voters) 
registered to vote, of which 49 percent were female and 56 percent were under the age of 
32” (NDI, 2008, p. 18).   
The 2007 campaign period lasted just under a month. Campaigning was 
conducted at all levels from small neighborhood rallies including traditional dancing to 
large scale media campaigns.  Local campaigning efforts included “a wide range of 
campaign tools including canvassing, parades, display of posters, distribution of visibility 
material and rallies” (European Union Election Observation Mission, 2007, p. 20)  
National campaign efforts were made by both Sierra Leone and the international 
community including the Sierra Leone Association of Journalists (SLAJ) and Democracy 
Sierra Leone (DSL), with support from the National Democratic Institute (NDI) and the 
US Agency for International Development (USAID).  
 All forms of media were used in the campaign process, but radio was the most 
dominant.  “Local community radio stations were…an important part of the campaign 
strategies” (European Union Election Observation Mission, 2007, p. 20). One of the most 
listened to radio stations was operated by the UN.  “In the run up to the elections, UN 
radio provided information about the election process, giving equal access to the political 
parties” (Commonwealth Observation Group, 2007, p. 23).  Both national and 
international media outlets were committed to ensuring the people of Sierra Leone were 
provided sufficient election campaign coverage.  Although the elections were not 
completely without complaints of bias, both voters and the international community 
viewed campaign coverage as equitable.   
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Sierra Leone’s electoral law quarantines the secrecy of the ballot.  Similar to the 
right to vote, efforts were made to ensure voters understood their rights and polling staff 
were trained to guarantee the secrecy of the vote.  For the 2007 elections, “more than 
37,000 polling staff were recruited and trained by international elections officials” (NDI, 
2008, p. 13).  There were also improvements made to ensure voters with disabilities, such 
as the blind, were able to vote and have their secrecy ensured.  Voters with disabilities 
were authorized to have assistance of their choice in the voter booth.  Voter education, 
better staffing, and training all combined to ensure the secrecy of the ballot.   
The official vote count was immediate.  “Votes cast were counted in each polling 
station immediately following the close of the polls.  Copies of the results from polling 
stations were then posted outside, thereby providing candidates, parties, and the public 
access to track the centralization of results at the national level” (NDI, 2008, p. 27).  
Once votes were counted and announced at local polling centers, they were sent to the 
national tally center in Freetown.  National and international election officials and 
journalists were present as votes were received and counts were recorded.  The results 
were released to the public in daily press briefs increasing confidence that votes were 
being counted and results recorded.  Finally, “as stipulated in the Electoral Act, the 
National Electoral Commission (NEC) results were announced and certified within two 
weeks of the polls” (NDI, 2008, p. 29). 
Sierra Leone’s independent NEC not only worked to educate voters and polling 
workers, but they also ensured that competing parties remained informed throughout the 
election process.  Competing parties were allotted equal campaign time and allowed to 
participate in televised debates.  Electoral law ensured final “ballot reconciliation, 
62 
 
counting and compilation of results were conducted in the presence of party agents and 
observers” (Commonwealth Observation Group, 2007, p. 19).   
NEC and international elections observers worked throughout the election to 
ensure the election process remained transparent and all parties remained accountable to 
election law and to the voters.  NEC “was regarded as independent, pro-active and neutral 
in the way it conducted all its activities” (Commonwealth Observation Group, 2007, p. 
18) and its efforts were credited with ensuring the accountability and openness of the 
electoral process to both voters and competing parties.  Sierra Leone has a history of 
electoral law and continuous review and reform.  The constitution and NEC mandate that 
electoral law must be in accordance with international election standards.  Prior to 2007, 
election reforms created a fair and acceptable electoral law.   
II. Defining Successful Post-conflict Elections  
 Sierra Leone is a constitutional democracy where voters choose the president. In 
the 2007 Sierra Leone Presidential Election voters chose from seven political parties.  
These included, the All People’s Congress (APC), the National Democratic Alliance 
(NDA), the Peace and Liberation Party (PLP), the People’s Democratic Party (PDP), the 
People’s Movement for Democratic Change (PMDC), the Revolutionary United Front 
Party (RUFP), the Sierra Leone People’s Party (SLPP) and the United National People’s 
Party (UNPP) (Commonwealth Observation Group, 2007).  The initial result failed to 
elect a president as no candidate received the mandatory 55 percent as specified in the 
constitution causing a run-off election between the two highest scoring candidates.  The 
final run-off election result elected All People’s Congress candidate Bai Koroma, with 
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received 54.6% of the final vote while Sierra Leone People’s Party candidate Vice-
President Solomon Berewa recieved 45.4%” (BBC News, 2007).  
In 2007, Sierra Leone was a more typical post-conflict election environment than 
Iraq.  It had a defined internal conflict, an international intervention, and the 
implementation of post-conflict peace terms including an election timeline.  Additionally, 
in 2007, the post-conflict level of violence was much lower than that of Iraq in 2010 and 
there was no outside military occupation.  UN peacekeepers and external combat troops 
formally departed Sierra Leone in 2005.   
Sierra Leone met more of the criteria previously established for successful post-
conflict elections, although it still did not meet all.  The complete set of post-conflict 
criteria, including the existence of critical social infrastructure, involvement of 
international actors, reintegration of former militant actors, and access to free and fair 
media were arguably not in place during the 2007 elections.   
Sierra Leone’s infrastructure was damaged or destroyed during the years of civil 
conflict and remained so in 2007.  Sierra Leone had extremely high levels of 
unemployment and over a 70 percent poverty rate.  The transportation system remained 
so damaged and underdeveloped it hindered not only internal transportation but economic 
growth as well.  In 2007, 40 percent of urban roads were still considered in poor 
condition as were over 50 percent of rural roads.  Additionally, only 8 percent of all roads 
in Sierra Leone were actually paved (Pushak & Foster, 2011, p. 21).  Although Sierra 
Leone has an abundant supply of water sources it remains unable to ensure it reaches the 
population centers especially in rural areas.  “On average, between 2000 and 2008 two 
percent of the population per year was getting access to wells and boreholes, while 
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around 3 percent of the population was getting access to traditional latrines” (Pushak & 
Foster, 2011, p. 32).  The continued lack of access to clean water in the years following 
the conflict demonstrates the fragility of infrastructure in Sierra Leone and directly 
contributed to crop damage, the spread of disease, dehydration, and “Sierra Leone’s 
exceptionally high under-five mortality rate (267 per 1,000 live births), the highest in the 
world” (Pushak & Foster, 2011, p. 32). Finally, the national power grid was only able to 
provide power to around five percent of the urban population and provided nothing in 
most rural areas.  Although improving, the overall critical infrastructure in Sierra Leone 
was substandard and inadequate in 2007.  The weak national power grid, broken roads 
and transportation system, poverty, unemployment, and illiteracy threatened both 
democracy as well as basic survival.   
 In 2007, the international military intervention had officially ended in Sierra 
Leone.  The UN mission ended in 2005 signaling the withdrawal of peacekeepers and 
military forces.  Yet, a small assistance mission remained in 2007 and Sierra Leone was 
still receiving substantial international support, including logistical, technical, and 
financial aid.  In 2007 over $25 million was allocated by the international community and 
it is undeniable that this financial contribution assisted in electoral success.  “The 
international community agreed to cover 70 percent of the cost of the election.  The UK, 
Ireland, and the EU channeled support through UN administered funds.  Other countries, 
including the US, Japan, Denmark, and Germany supported the electoral process through 
direct assistance to the NEC, civil society, the PPRC, and other stakeholders” (NDI, 
2008, p. 16).  Although military forces had left, international support remained and it was 
not unnoticed.  A 2009 report by the UN Security Council unquestionably concluded that 
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what Sierra Leone would need in order to succeed was time, patience, determined 
national leadership, and continued international support.   
 The 2007 election of Ernest Bai Koroma fails to meet the basic definition of 
transforming militant leaders into political leaders.  “He is a 1976 graduate of the Fourah 
Bay College with a degree in economics and Business Management…who speaks four 
languages” (Kamanda, 2007). He was a successful insurance broker who when elected 
promised “to run Sierra Leone like a business concern” (Kamanda, 2007).  Koroma was a 
business man, a scholar, and a politician but not a militant leader.    
In broader terms, Sierra Leone still fails to demonstrate reintegration success.  
Sierra Leone’s reintegration process was complicated and difficult.  The use and 
recruitment of child soldiers made reintegration an international priority.  Both the 
international community and Sierra Leone needed to give these child soldiers a future and 
a home in post-conflict Sierra Leone.  The result of this was a massive effort and the 
disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) program which was funded by the 
international community.  The success and figures reported validated international 
funding and efforts.  “Sierra Leone’s DDR process was widely regarded as a success 
story…more than 70,000 fighters – 89 percent of the estimated total pool of ex-
combatants – were demobilized by the international community and peace has been 
maintained in the four years since the war came to an end” (Humphreys & Weinstein, 
2005, p. 4).  It is easy to look at the large numbers reported and conclude success.   
 The numbers alone fail to account for the challenges reintegration faced in post-
conflict Sierra Leone.  Foremost among these challenges is extreme poverty.  The high 
unemployment and low wages made it difficult to ensure jobs and positions within the 
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new government for reintegrated combatants.  “Securing employment for ex-combatants 
represents a major challenge.  The danger of disgruntled ex-combatants drifting into 
criminality or even renewed conflict remains a potential threat” (Ginifer, 2003, p. 39).  In 
addition to poverty, reintegration was challenged by the extreme number of ex-
combatants, and the level of violence attributed to their atrocities and war crimes.  These 
challenged the international community’s ability to fund reintegration as well as Sierra 
Leone’s willingness to accept the concept.  Due to the number of unemployed ex-
combatants, the money allocated to reintegration quickly ran out and the international 
community was asked to increase funding.  “Reintegration in Sierra Leone is clearly 
dependent on donors making a major contribution, as the Sierra Leone government is not 
able to absorb these costs” (Ginifer, 2003, p. 40).  Even donor contributions were not 
enough and efforts were forced from long term reintegration such as career training and 
placement, to short term projects such as weapons turn-ins.  Along with reduced 
capabilities, reintegration efforts faced a population unwilling to accept ex-combatants.  
“Neighbors were asked to forgive those who had participated in violent acts such as rape 
and murder as well as live next to ex-combatants who have held on to property looted 
during the conflict, despite the presence of the rightful owner in the community” (Ginifer, 
2003, p. 47).  Finally, there is little evidence that those involved in the reintegration 
numbers reported actually gave up fighting and resumed any place in society let alone in 
the government.  There is evidence of reintegration failure in Sierra Leone where the 
“program disarmed 70,000 combatants, but up to 2,000 are thought to re-recruited and 
indeed later fought in wars” (Kaikai, 2004). 
Between 1999 and 2007, Sierra Leone saw significant improvements in media 
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capabilities and journalistic professionalism.  “Sierra Leone‘s media sector has 
diversified at a remarkable rate over the past 10 years. A proliferation of radio stations 
nationwide, television service established in some provinces, and a plethora of 
newspapers published daily and weekly in Freetown have changed the structural 
conditions for information and knowledge sharing” (SFCG, 2005, p. 1).  By the 2007 
elections, there were 59 registered newspapers.  Television broadcast also experienced 
some growth but this was limited due to the weak national power grid.  Still, in 2007 
there were both national and local television stations and the election, debates, and results 
were available to viewers in urban areas.  The most successful method of media coverage 
was the radio.  In fact, a study on media in Sierra Leone concluded that “radio is the most 
important channel for receiving information by the public…and is by far the most 
widespread with almost national coverage” (SFCG, 2005, p. 2).  Radio was extremely 
important in Sierra Leone due to its ability to overcome the challenges posed by illiteracy 
and the lack of power.  “Over 80 percent of the population had access to radio and the 
majority listen to radio every day” (BBC World Service Trust & SFCG, 2007, p. 3).  
With the assistance of international organizations, the government of Sierra Leone 
distributed portable battery powered radios which ensured election coverage to radio 
listeners across the country.   
Radio coverage and programming was tailored to meet the population’s needs and 
capabilities.  Programs offered call in sessions where voters could voice their concerns 
and opinions.  Coverage was expanded to rural areas and became the main source of 
information, and in some places the only source.  Additionally, radio was provided in 
local dialects and languages ensuring all voters were informed (SFCG, 2005, p. 33). 
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 In 2007, Sierra Leone journalists received increased training focused on election 
coverage.  Training taught basics such as interview techniques and fact checking but also 
covered the constitution and the capabilities of the NEC.  Journalists voluntarily signed 
an election media code of practice agreeing to be “truthful, accurate, balanced, to refrain 
from publishing material likely to cause public disorder or incite hatred and give equal 
access to paid political advertising” (NDI, 2008, p. 26). 
Improvements in media access and coverage were crucial in reporting election 
results.  Unofficial counts started as soon as polls closed and were conducted in public 
view.  Once completed, the results were immediately telephoned in to local radio stations 
and newspapers in a media network organized by the UN.  Newspapers and radio were 
able to report these counts immediately which allowed voters to see their vote counted, 
hear their vote recorded, and read vote updates as part of the national count.  This media 
network gave the elections transparency and gave voters an undeniable role in the 
election.  This directly transferred into voter confidence, evident in one voter’s response 
that when “in the past we voted—the votes were taken away and the government won the 
election—now we can truly see who is winning and who is losing” (UN election worker, 
2010). 
III. Conclusion 
 This research concludes that Sierra Leone conducted a successful national level 
election in 2010.  The election was within international standards.  Voters were free to 
participate, campaigning was accessible and equitable among political parties, voters had 
reasonable secrecy of the ballot, ballots were counted efficiently and timely, and the 
entire process was transparent to voters and political parties.    
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 This research did not find all criteria present in Sierra Leone.  Sierra Leone 
conducted successful post-conflict elections in an environment with a strong presence of 
international actors (albeit no foreign military presence) and media access but in the 
absence of successful reintegration and without the presence of critical infrastructure.  
There was a very strong international presence involved in elections administration and 
observations, but not a strong troop presence on the ground.  Additionally, there was a 
strong media presence allowing the process to be fully transparent to both voters and the 
international community.   
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Chapter Five 
The conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) lasted from 1992 until 1995.  BiH 
gained its independence following the end of the Cold War.  Ethnic and religious tensions 
were volatile prior to independence and immediately threatened security upon the 
establishment of the independent state.  Tensions continued and elevated eventually 
resulting in a three-year war.  The conflict “led to 100,000 deaths, both civilian and 
military, and nearly 1.3 million internally displaced persons” (Filipov, 2006, p. 23).  The 
conflict gained international attention in part because of the associated ethnic cleansing 
and genocide.  World news regularly reported the situation in BiH where the population 
was systematically “cut off from food, utilities, and communication then driven from 
their homes, held in detention camps, raped, tortured, deported, or killed” (Filipov, 2006, 
p. 26).  The images of starving children, mass graves, and genocide horrified 
international viewers who pressured leaders into political action.   
The Dayton Accord Cease-Fire Agreement (DACFA) was signed on 21 
November 1995 and officially ended the conflict in BiH.  International intervention 
started three years prior to the official end providing necessary assistance with security 
and humanitarian aid.  The initial military intervention estimates called for almost 70,000 
international troops.  The US made up a majority of the requested troops and political 
leaders were initially hesitant to commit such large numbers to a European conflict.  
Additionally it feared politically unpopular to commit troops to what could become a 
long term international intervention.  Without the committed support of the US military, 
other international forces delayed committing to intervention.  The international 
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community watched closely as the US debated sending troops and when they initially 
declined to send support, several other nations followed and also declined to send troops.  
In 1995, the international community could no longer ignore the images of suffering from 
BiH.  The US and other nations were forced to react and the result was United Nations 
Mission Bosnia Herzegovina (UNMIBH).  This included a peacekeeping and 
humanitarian mission.  UNMIBH committed over 2,000 military and civilian 
peacekeepers from 47 participating nations.  Additionally, the North Alantic Treaty 
Organization (NATO) provided international military support initially with 
“Implementation Force (IFOR) in December 1995…and later by the NATO-led 
Stabilization Force (SFOR).”  Throughout the NATO mission international military 
support was as high as “60,000 troops provided by 36 allied and partner countries” 
(North Alantic Treaty Organization, 2012).  In 2004, NATO officially completed the last 
SFOR mission and transferred the peacekeeping mission to the European Union, which 
remains in place today.   
In 1945, following the end of World War II, BiH became a constituent republic of 
the socialist Federative People’s Republic of Yugoslavia.  After the fall of the Soviet 
Union, BiH declared independence from Yugoslavia.  The nation created a constitution 
and established a democratic system.  In November 1990 BiH held its first democratic 
election.  The results were dismal and highly divided among ethnic lines.  This 
exacerbated the existing issues to the point of civil war. 
   Although the civil war fighting was not over, the international community did 
successfully implement a cease-fire.  DACFA was designed to end the fighting and 
reinstate democracy.  It mandated democratic elections and set the date for the first post-
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conflict elections in 1996.  Early efforts were made to delay the 1996 elections by citing 
the criteria for free and fair elections that had not yet been met.  Concerns included that  
“repatriation and reintegration of refugees had not begun; indicted war criminals 
continued to exert influence behind the scenes; and freedom of movement and expression 
remained severely restricted” (ICG, 1996, p. 1).  Some in the international community, 
including the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), declared 
that elections were being rushed and should be postponed.  Yet, elections were conducted 
according to the DACFA mandate and the results were dismal.  Widespread reports of 
electoral issues, voter registration fraud, disenfranchised voters, and intimidation all 
caused the international community to question the validity and impact of the 1996 
elections.  Many declared the elections were neither free nor fair and the 1996 BiH post-
conflict election remains debated and continues to serve as a case study in election timing 
consequence.  
I. Defining Successful Elections  
 BiH is an “emerging federal democratic republic... where the three members of 
the presidency (one Bosniak, one Croat, one Serb) [are] elected by popular vote for a 
four-year term” (CIA, 2013).  The 2010 BiH Presidential Election results elected Nebojsa 
Radmanovic with 48.9% of the votes for the Serb seat; Zeljko Komsic with 60.6% of the 
votes for the Croat seat; Bakir Izetbegovic with 34.9% of the votes for the Bosniak seat” 
(CIA, 2013).    
The 2010 election in BiH was accepted as successful by BiH and the international 
community.  Fifteen years post-conflict, BiH appeared able to conduct free and fair 
elections and subsequently serve as an example to the international community for post-
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conflict democracy.  Post-conflict accords such as DACFA worked to ensure an electoral 
system that was generally consistent and acceptable with international election standards.  
All of the established criteria previously discussed in this research were present and 
voters had several elections worth of experience.  Additional voter confidence was 
strengthened through lessons learned and augmented by constitutional amendments.  
Democracy in BiH is certainly not without criticism, controversy, or complexity, yet the 
2010 election qualifies as successful.   
The BiH constitution grants suffrage to all citizens over the age of 18.  
Additionally, it has an inclusive clause authorizing the right to vote for those age 16 and 
up if they are employed.  BiH suffrage laws are generally considered in line with 
international standards and it is agreed and practiced that all voters are free and able to 
vote.  There still remain a large number of displaced persons who are a residual 
consequence of the conflict.  In 2010, an estimated one million persons were still living 
abroad and special consideration was granted to voters outside of BiH and those 
relocated.  This resulted in 36,474 displaced voters who were registered and able to vote 
(OSCE/ODIHR, 2010).  In total, 1,769,249 voters actually voted with a turn out rate of 
56.49%.   
The BiH election law is complicated in part because it allows an unlimited 
number of candidates and parties to register for office.  In 2010, “63 political subjects 
were registered or 30 political parties were contesting in these elections, 11 coalitions of 
political parties and 13 independent candidates” (OSCE/ODIHR, 2010, p. 12). 
Campaigning in 2010 was competitive but remained overall uneventful and peaceful.  
“Electoral contestants were generally able to conduct their campaign activities without 
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hindrance either from the authorities or from other parties.  Occasionally, campaigning 
was marred by nationalist rhetoric and inflammatory statements by certain electoral 
contestants” (OSCE/ODIHR, 2010, p. 12).  Candidates and parties were allotted equal 
access to print and broadcast media.  Although there were complaints of sabotage and 
corruption between competing parties, the complaints were handled quickly and 
effectively.   
Secrecy of the ballot is ensured in Article 5.11 of the BiH election law.  It states 
that “members of the polling station committee shall explain to the voter the manner of 
polling and ensure secrecy of the voting.  Members of the polling station committee shall 
not exert influence on the decision of the voter” (OSCE/ODIHR, 2012).  Voters are 
relatively confident in the current system and generally vote free from concern.  Special 
envelopes are used for those living abroad and mailing in ballots.  
Ballot counting was closely observed, documented, and broadcast.  Party officials and 
international observers were present at all stages of the vote count allowing for instant 
and transparent conflict resolution.  Counting “lasted throughout the night due to the 
detailed and complex procedures and the four different types of ballots that needed to be 
counted in each polling station.” (OSCE/ODIHR, 2010, p. 2)  Presidential results were 
announced on election night, and other results followed the next day.   
The Central Election Commission (CEC) is the overall supervision authority as 
mandated by BiH election law.  The CEC is a seven member committee that must have at 
“two Bosniaks, two Croats, two Serbs and one member of other ethnicity” 
(OSCE/ODIHR, 2010, p. 7).  The CEC chairperson is elected by its membership for 21 
months and the ethnicity of the chair is considered as part of the overall ethnic 
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requirements.  This complicated and detailed framework was designed to ensure 
representation among different ethnicities and limits terms for those appointed.  Although 
electoral law is considered overly complex, voters consider the CEC satisfactory and 
efficient. 
The CEC is responsible to ensure transparency and involvement among all 
political parties through open and public events.  The political process is documented and 
available for review by anyone at any time.  Documentation induced all aspects of the 
election from voter registration lists to costs and administrative implications.  BiH 
remains divided by ethnicity, but not by political parties.  Through mandated ethnic 
representation BiH is able to ensure openness and the involvement of all parties.   
In the years since the conflict, BiH election law has been changed and amended in 
accordance with voter’s needs and lessons learned.  “Overall, the legal framework for 
elections is comprehensive and generally provides a sound basis for the conduct of 
democratic elections” (OSCE/ODIHR, 2010, p. 5).  It contains considerations for 
displaced voters, women and minorities, voter registration, and candidacy requirements 
and is therefore accepted by both voters and the international community.  
II. Defining Successful Post-conflict Elections   
Although elections in BiH serve as an example of successful post-conflict 
democratization, the environment in which they took place was far from ideal.  Living 
conditions and infrastructure in BiH were still undergoing significant changes and 
transitions.  Medical care, education, governance, and other services in BiH were far 
below that of its EU neighbors. 
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“The 2010 general elections were conducted amongst a high rate of 
unemployment (especially among youth), low GDP per-capita, ethnic division, an 
absence of any type of cooperation among elected officials” (Mirsad, 2012, p. 71).  
Infrastructure development today remains unstable with post-conflict growth and 
development slowing and in some cases stopping, as international assistance funding is 
gradually reduced.  Much of the destruction and damage from the war remains unrepaired 
through a combination of poor governance and limited financial resources.  The political 
and economic crises have worsened the living standards to the point where more than 25 
percent of the citizens are estimated to live in severe poverty (Christensen, 2011).  
Additionally, economic effects from the global financial recession have worsened the 
already damaged infrastructure.  When compared to other post-conflict environments like 
Sierra Leone or Iraq, BiH is undoubtedly better than most.  Yet when compared with its 
own past or its EU neighbors, BiH’s critical infrastructure remains far below standard.   
The international community has drastically reduced its presence and commitment in the 
15 years since the conflict.  According to one observer, “this may partly be due to 
political fatigue after having played such a prominent role in the country for so long” 
(Woehrel, 2013, p. 6).  By 2010, the international community was largely removed from 
BiH politics and the election was considered “entirely administered by the authorities of 
Bosnia and Herzegovina” (OSCE/ODIHR, 2010, p. 1). 
The international community’s presence was reduced but it remained committed not just 
during conflict but for years after because “post-conflict assistance is a broad, long-term 
effort that requires humanitarian, security, economic, governance, and democracy-
building measures” (United States General Accounting Office, 2003).  There were still 
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international actors present as election observers and officials.  BiH law requires both 
international and domestic observers and there were over 53,000 observers present in 
2010.  Financial assistance continued as well.  Since 1996, “the World Bank has 
committed over $1.1 billion, while other World Bank agencies had sent $500 million by 
2010” (Bardos, 2010).  Additionally, “the EU invested EUR 91.280 million in Bosnia 
under the 2011 budget of the Instrument for Pre-accession Assistance (IPA)” (Berjan, et 
all, 2012, p. 638).  Other counties including the US continued to support BiH well after 
the end of the UN mission.  Although in 2010 international actors within BiH were 
reduced, support continued and “during the period 2009-10 donor agencies and 
international financial institutions had development activities within the sectors of 
education; health; good governance and institution building; conflict prevention and 
resolution, peace and security; infrastructure; economic development and social 
protection; local governance; agriculture and forestry; environmental protection without 
forgetting cross-cutting programs and projects” (Berjan, et all, 2012, p. 638). 
The three members of the BiH presidency elected in 2010 fail to completely meet 
the reintegration definition of transforming militant leaders into political leaders.  Komsic 
has a law degree from the University of Sarajevo and studied in the United States at 
Georgetown University.  Radmanovic is a philosophy student with a degree from the 
University of Belgrade.  Izetbegovic was an architect with a degree from the University 
of Sarajevo in Architecture (Lafreniere, 2011).  Although Zeljko Komsic served in the 
Army of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the three members of the presidency 
are academics and not militants. 
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In broader terms, there is little evidence of reintegration success in post-conflict BiH.  
“Reconciliation has not had the desired effect, and has in many ways been 
counterproductive” (Christensen, 2011, p. 9).  As with the other countries in this research, 
reintegration in BiH was hindered by the large number of ex-combatants, an estimated 
45,000 (World Bank, 2002), as well as defining who the actual ex-combatants were 
“from the mix of regular soldiers, paramilitary combatants, or just weekend fighters” 
(Pietz, 2005, p. 15).  Additionally, BiH had it own unique issues such as “the constraints 
of the Dayton Peace Agreement; the situation of the Bosnian economy and society during 
the project implementations; and the political decisions and measurements regarding the 
demobilization of soldiers and restructuring of the armed forces up until today, and the 
potential ones in the future” (Pietz, 2005, p. 20).  DACFA mandated reintegration efforts 
but failed to define how they would take place, how they would be funded, or who was in 
charge of the program.  BiH also had societal issues reintegrating soldiers who suffer 
from conditions similar to what is currently diagnosed as PTSD.  Soldiers had displayed 
symptoms which “had a fundamental impact on a person’s ability to function in society: 
to look for a job, to stay employed, or just to live with his/her partner or family” (Pietz, 
2005, p. 67).  The reintegration program could not help these soldiers reintegrate into 
their families and neighborhoods and certainty could not assist them in becoming part of 
the new government.  The economy was not strong enough to provide jobs for the 
reintegrated soldiers even if they were mentally capable of maintaining a job.  The result 
was a generation of “combat-trained, unemployed, and traumatized former soldiers… still 
a security risk for the state and its society, because small arms and medium sized 
weapons are widely available” (Pietz, 2005, p. 67).  Failed reintegration in BiH created a 
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population which was recruited by extremist organizations and organized crime, as was 
the case in Iraq.  Reintegration efforts in BiH did not create a path for ex-combatants to 
exchange military power for political power, but instead created a dangerous and 
vulnerable population who traded one fight for another.   
BiH has a developed and mature media industry.  There is a long history of 
available media outlets and a largely literate population.  This historic presence of media 
in BiH makes it easier for voters to identify and understand the media’s role, but its 
history also includes a negative past.  When the area was under communist control as part 
of Yugoslavia all media was government run and controlled.  After the end of 
communism, media was supposed to be freed from government control.  In reality, it was 
still heavily government influenced and the voters knew it.  The media was seen as a 
government agent used for propaganda and inciting ethnic hatred. 
In 2010, there were 12 daily newspapers, 97 weekly newspapers, 147 radio stations and 
46 television stations.  BiH has a literacy level of over 90 percent which is well above 
most post-conflict countries.  Newspapers are widely distributed and read.  BiH reports as 
much as “74 percent of the males and 63 percent of the females citizens read newspapers 
daily” (Christensen, 2011, p. 11).  Even with numbers that high, newspaper remains the 
second most accessed media outlet.  Television is the principal media outlet in BiH.   
In 2010, television played the largest role in election coverage.  In the words of one group 
of international observers, “national public media complied with legal requirements on 
the equal allocation of free airtime to contestants.  The variety of views reflected by 
public media provided voters with an opportunity to make informed choices” 
(OSCE/ODIHR, 2010, p. 2).  Daily media, especially television, flooded viewers with 
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voter education programs and campaign coverage.  Debates and focused interviews 
allowed voters to evaluate candidates while ensuring equal access to opposing views and 
neutral coverage.    
Privately owned media was able to provide a platform for specific messaging.  
Candidates also used smaller private media that allowed less restricted messaging.  
Private media also allowed candidates to include ethnic bias in their messaging.  
Government agencies and neutral observers received several complaints about privately 
broadcast campaign messages including several about bias and fraud; however,  the 
government’s handling of such complaints was regarded as positive and encouraged voter 
confidence in media coverage.   
III. Conclusion 
The 2010 elections “were generally conducted in line with international standards 
for democratic elections.  Therefore, the sixth general BiH elections represented further 
development in the consolidation of democracy and the rule of law” (Mirsad, 2012, p. 
73). The election was free and fair but not perfect.  Still in 2010, voters had access to the 
vote, political parties were free to campaign, voters had reasonable expectations of 
secrecy of the ballot, votes were counted with speed and transparency that was open to 
both voters and political parties within an accepted electoral law.   
This research concluded the criteria for successful elections were not present in 
BiH 2010.  The international community still did have a vested interest and presence in 
BiH although certainly a reduced presence compared to earlier elections.  BiH also had a 
strong media active in all parts of the election process.  There were complaints of media 
bias, but the media generally played a vital part in election education, campaign, and 
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transparency.  In 2010, BiH did not demonstrate a presence of successful reintegration.  
Of the cases studied within the research, BiH was the furthest removed from conflict and 
therefore could have contributed to the lack of evidence for reintegration success.  BiH 
was found to have higher levels of critical infrastructure than the other cases studied, but 
when compared its own past or its EU neighbors, BiH’s infrastructure remained weak and 
damaged.  Consistent with the other cases in this research, BiH in 2010 conducted 
successful elections in the presence of international actors and an active media.  This 
research concludes that lower rates of reintegration and damaged critical infrastructure 
were mitigated by the strong media presence and support from international actors. 
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Chapter Six 
This thesis explored the criteria for successful elections in post-conflict countries.  
It attempted to answer if there is a set of criteria necessary for successful elections in 
post-conflict countries, and if so, do all criteria need to be present in order to ensure 
election success.  The evidence within this research found the set of criteria was not 
consistently present within the three case studies.  Although not all criteria were present, 
research found evidence that one criterion, the use of free and fair media, was present in 
all three cases.  Additionally, this research concludes that international actor involvement 
was also present in all three cases.  
Although this research indicated that the assistance of international actors was 
present in all three cases, it did not research if the converse is true in failed elections.  
This thesis recommends future research is conducted with cases involving failed elections 
such as Kenya where failed elections in 2007 caused global concerns if democracy was 
good for Africa or in Ethiopia where a panel discussion on Elections in Africa concluded 
that in Ethiopia “everybody agreed that here the prospective for democracy remained 
very bleak” (Ministry of Foreign Affairs-the Hauge (Netherlands), 2009, p. 25).  The 
panel discussion recommendations for Elections in Africa and a majority of the responses 
focused on continued donor support.  Dr. Lindberg stated that “the donor community 
needs to be there in big number [and] there needs to be commitment to stay for the long 
run” (Ministry of Foreign Affairs-the Hague (Netherlands), 2009, p. 8).  Dr. Marcel 
Rutten presented several recommendations and a majority included increased 
commitment from the international and donor community including recommendations 
such as united international community support, continued international observation 
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during elections, and outside support for NGOs (Ministry of Foreign Affairs-the Hague 
(Netherlands), 2009). 
This research concludes international assistance was present in all three successful 
elections but does not intend to portray the international community as completely 
altruistic without an independent agenda or a capacity for wrong doing.  Within the scope 
of this research it found accountability is a huge problem within the international 
community in post-conflict countries.  Personnel, equipment, resources, and money are 
provided in quantities that would be challenging to track even under ideal circumstances, 
such as the billions of dollars allocated to Iraq and Afghanistan.  The lack of 
accountability often increases problems such as corruption in countries where “corruption 
is one of the biggest challenges to the success of post-conflict agendas. This is because 
post-conflict environments present extraordinarily high opportunities and low punitive 
risks for corrupt activity” (Hamid, 2009). Additionally, this research has already 
acknowledged that democracy is capable of producing corrupt leaders and that the 
international community has historically supported such leaders at least if these leaders 
are sympathetic to foreign policy interests.  William Easterly summed up this concept in 
The White Man’s Burden, when he noted that the west has “embraced some dictators as 
allies” (Easterly, 2006, p. 866) Dr. Lindberg’s conclusion was consistent when he 
declared to a panel discussion on African elections “I am comfortable to say…, that the 
donor community has been complicit in supporting bad leaders” (Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs-the Hague (Netherlands), 2009, p. 26). 
While conducting this research, several challenges were immediately 
encountered.  The first challenge was identifying an agreed upon definition of successful 
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post-conflict elections.  Determining election success can be difficult even in experienced 
democracies, as evident in the 2000 US Presidential election; therefore defining success 
in an emerging democracy can present an even greater challenge.  Defining success can 
range from simply holding elections or being as complex as involving criteria such as 
voter turnout, electoral make up, and a candidate’s leadership ability.  For this research a 
set of criteria was used to establish that all three cases were successful, and although the 
set of criteria chosen provided an initial definition of success, there remains an 
opportunity for future academic work in the establishment of a more complete definition 
for successful post-conflict elections.  The criteria this thesis used were admittedly a 
minimalist overview used to provide only a foundation for larger research.  Future more 
comprehensive research on the criteria to define a successful democratic election could 
itself be an entire thesis.  Comprehensive concepts such as contained in Philippe C. 
Schmitter and Terry Lynn Karl’s research What Democracy is …and is Not include 
criteria that are not all inclusive of democracy but provide a “matrix of combinations that 
are differently democratic” (Schmitter & Karl, 1991, p. 253).  Their criteria include 
concepts such as consensus, participation, access, responsiveness, majority rule, 
parliamentary sovereignty, party government, pluralism, federalism, presidentialism, and 
checks and balance.  Each of the above mentioned concepts are certainty more 
comprehensive criteria that the criteria chosen for this thesis and the presence or absence 
of any in a post-conflict election could potentially be used in future definitions of post-
conflict elections.  Schmitter and Karl admit to some of the same challenges this thesis 
found and warn against a generic definition of success and conclude that a generic 
definition including the above mentioned criteria “would be to mistake the American 
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polity for the universal model of democratic governance” (Schmitter & Karl, 1991, p. 
253). 
A second challenge was the availability and reliability of post-conflict election 
data.  The three cases for this thesis were chosen in part due to their temporal proximity 
in order to obtain more consistency in data collection methods and data availability.  
Unfortunately, the data available still relied heavily on information collected and 
analyzed by the same international actors who were considered a criterion within the 
thesis.  The data available also lacked consistency in collection method and varied within 
the different elections studied.  Once again, this research identified another opportunity 
for future academic work in globally standardizing post-conflict election data collection.   
The findings of this thesis, particularly in the use of media, should be considered 
in future post-conflict elections.  Available media should be used to its maximum 
capability to ensure voters are informed of the democratic process and elections are 
conducted in the most transparent way possible.  This combination provides a greater 
chance of success in terms of both voter participation and confidence in the democratic 
process.  This research did not determine any superiority or ranking within the types of 
media or associated technology but rather found the greatest success when usage was 
tailored to the local media landscape, as evidenced by the use of radio in Sierra Leone 
and the use of social media in Iraq.  This research recommends media strategies that are 
adapted to country’s individual capabilities, needs, and challenges.  Issues such as ethnic 
and language divides, literacy levels, technical infrastructure, technical experience, prior 
experience with government controlled media, and cultural preferences must be 
addressed in a case-by-case basis in post-conflict countries.  Although this research 
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concludes that media is universally important in predicting success of post-conflict 
elections it did not find evidence of a one size fits all approach nor does it recommend it 
is pursued.     
Once again, this research focused on successful elections only.  Future research is 
recommended to test the media’s effect with case studies involving failed elections.  
Research critical of the media’s involvement in failed elections such as in Kenya can help 
strengthen the argument in this research as well as offer a deeper understanding on the 
importance of the media.  In an article critical of the media in Kenya Henry Makori 
concludes the media failed Kenya in its duty to report the elections objectively and argues 
that they “should have used election reporting as an opportunity for national political 
education” (Makori, 2013). He argues that the media’s coverage failed to report key 
issues that led to the elections failure such as election violence and fraud involving “a 
gang of about 50 youths [who] had gone from house to house in Nairobi's volatile 
Mathare slum confiscating identity cards at gun-point” (Makori, 2013) and the murder of 
several election officials as they arrived to work on election day.  The failure of the 
media to accurately and objectively report the election allowed the people of Kenya and 
the rest of the world to ignore the issues of rampant corruption and violence.  A previous 
report concluded the Kenyan media’s self-censorship and unwillingness to seek the truth 
“clearly failed to do its job and fulfill its obligations” (Reporters Without Borders, 2008). 
This research failed to conclusively demonstrate the presence or need for 
successful reintegration of former combatants in any of the three cases studied.  This 
thesis recommends additional research is conducted to define as well as determine the 
effect of reintegrating former combatants.  There is evidence that the current process for 
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reintegration actually contributes to its failure.  The process is lengthy and requires long-
term international support and financing.  Often these programs are reduced when 
funding runs out even if objectives have not been achieved.  Additionally, the formality 
of the process deepens existing hostilities through the classification of who is or is not a 
reintegrated ex-combat.  On the one hand, reintegrated combatants can be seen as being 
rewarded or, conversely, they can be seen as being shamed into compliance.  Either way, 
identifying a separate system and classification are only reasons to divide at a time where 
unification is so critical.  Another issue with reintegration is that in disbanding militias a 
new unemployed population is created usually within an environment that is typically 
unable to provide any employment, let alone an equitable position replacement.  This 
population quickly becomes a source of instability and possible targets for insurgent 
recruitment.  Finally identifying and reintegrating ex-combatants is often impossible due 
to the high percentage of the population usually involved.  The process should be 
reevaluated and redefined in accordance with lessons learned from recent conflicts.   
Finally, the existence of critical infrastructure and implied safety and security 
were not found to be necessary for conducting successful post conflict elections.  This 
research finds evidence that democratic elections should assist with the establishment of 
critical infrastructure and therefore it is unreasonable to use the lack of such 
infrastructure as an excuse for not holding these same elections.  Furthermore, the 
definition of critical infrastructure varies within each post-conflict environment.  A 
uniform standard cannot be applied and evaluated and therefore makes it a poor choice 
for research criteria.   
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This research did find evidence of indicating that elections should not wait for the 
ideal environment.  In a discussion on Elections in Africa where Dr. Lindberg was asked 
if elections should wait for infrastructure requirements, he answered “we don’t need to 
have all the factors in place [and should] start holding elections early” (Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs-the Hague (Netherlands), 2009, p. 25).  Dr. Lindberg’s research 
consistently concludes that elections should be held and that there “is little evidence in 
the account that it is dangerous to hold elections early” (Ministry of Foreign Affairs-the 
Hague (Netherlands), 2009, p. 9). 
Understanding and defining post-conflict elections will continue to be of 
academic importance.  It may be difficult to assign a set of criteria to all post-conflict 
elections due to the vastly different environments and conditions associated with each 
conflict.  Still, there is value in continuing to research the conditions, and in some cases, 
such as this thesis, research can conclude that certain criteria are or are not associated 
with election success.  In such cases future efforts should be made to ensure the existence 
of the defined criterion which offers the best chance of success.  In addition to academic 
commitment the international community should also remain committed to post-conflict 
societies ensuring lasting support, peacekeeping forces, and reconstruction resources.  
International commitment needs to be consistent, honest, and realistic in its goals, 
motivations, and expectations.  Failure to provide sufficient and lasting commitment 
damages the international image of the contributing county, “but, more significantly, the 
sustainability of democracy” (Radnitz, 2011, p. 5).  Long term assistance should be 
considered prior to international involvement in post-conflict countries in order to 
properly identify total scope of assistance needed and avoid such damage (a central 
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theme of Collier in The Bottom Billion).  Traditionally the international community has 
provided initial financial, personnel, and material support as researched in all three case 
studies in this thesis.  It is also evident in this research that international support and 
commitment reduces significantly over time and demonstrates a lack of long-term 
strategic planning.  The reasons for reduced or withdrawn support range from funding 
commitments and restrictions, lack of identified international goals, and general loss of 
public interest and support.  The result of this is evident and “international organizations 
have been repeatedly criticized for not having had much success in post-conflict 
situations and it is more often than not the lack of commitment” (Sivapathasundaram, 
2004, p.28).   
Lack of appropriate long-term planning and support has additional compounding 
negative consequences.  Past international failures will undoubtedly continue to influence 
the international community’s willingness to provide future support.  Recent US led 
interventions in Iraq and Afghanistan demonstrate the effect of prolonged and 
unanticipated long-term involvement.  In both cases support was initially strong and 
gradually reduced as the conflict continued.  The noticeable reduction of international 
involvement, and the subsequent US-centric democratization process, resulted in the loss 
of support and legitimacy to the entire mission.  This has likely influenced US and 
international involvement in current post-conflict environments.  Maintaining long-term 
support will continue to be a challenge and will often be conducted in dangerous, 
unstable, and politically unpopular conditions.   
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There is a significant need in the academic community to research and define 
long-term strategic planning as it relates to post-conflict democracy.  International actors, 
especially if they are the initial aggressor, would benefit from academic research defining 
long-term planning and the scope of support required prior to engaging the world 
community to act in a post-conflict environment.  Continuing to study and understand the 
actual commitment needed to support a post-conflict country is vital in any future 
international involvement.   
Finally, this thesis concludes with a critique of the research itself.  As noted, this 
research was designed in Iraq in 2010.  The amount of financial, personnel, material, and 
military support involved in conducting the 2010 election was personally observed by the 
author and directly inspired this research.  It was apparent the cost was tremendous in 
dollars, time, and in lives lost.  Attacks on Election Day alone resulted in 69 Iraqi deaths 
(Gamal & Rasheed, 2010).  The presence of support inspired the research with questions 
such as: are there identified criteria that if present will improve the chances of post-
conflict election success, if so, can they be applied to all post-conflict environments or 
are they case specific, is there a level of presence criteria must demonstrate before they 
can be considered able to influence success, and if there are such criteria does the entire 
set need to be present prior to holding elections?  From those initial questions, the overall 
thesis statement was crafted into the question is there a set of criteria established to 
determine if an area is ready to conduct post-conflict elections, and  do all criteria need to 
be present in order to ensure successful post-conflict elections?   
It quickly became evident that post-conflict democracy is much more complicated 
then post-conflict elections and the success or failure of these elections is only a small 
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predictor of a democracy’s sustainability.  Democracy is in itself an academic pursuit 
with contested definitions and associated concepts.  Concepts such as by the people for 
the people, free and fair elections, rule of law, civil society, public virtues, and civic 
infrastructure are all indicators of democracy and the presence of absence of any can 
significantly affect the quality of a democracy (Radnitz, 2011).  This research chose not 
to include such concepts in determining the success or failure of post-conflict elections 
and was admittedly restricted by the minimalist definition of successful elections.  It 
would have benefited from a definition that included both democratic success as well as 
election success.  It is recommended future research on post-conflict elections include a 
comprehensive review of such concepts when defining success because as the 2011 Task 
Force review warned “to judge a democracy based solely on the scope of free and fair 
elections is limited and discounts other indicators necessary to label a government a 
democracy” (Radnitz, 2011, p. 12). 
Although the topic of this thesis was reduced to only election success, it had to 
acknowledge and understand the DPT and its application in the international policy 
world.  Research into the topic was limited and only highlighted its importance in post-
conflict elections.  This research and future research would benefit from continuing to 
understand and possibly redefine DPT as it relates to today’s political environment.  
Motivation for current democracy promotion would also benefit from additional research 
and more precise defining.  The economic, military, and possible retaliatory agendas 
motivating current US led democracy promotion are vastly different from Wilson’s 
League of Nations or Roosevelt’s United Nations.  The difference and changes should be 
researched to understand if it is even fair to compare the current system within prior 
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established criteria and definitions.  Future research could help define if DPT is still a 
viable political strategy or if what we see today needs to be reclassified under an updated 
theory.  
The choices for case studies discussed in the introduction are also part of the final 
critique.  Using three different geographical areas, three different levels of military 
involvement, and three different phases of post-conflict democracy allowed this research 
to test criteria in an attempt to identify criteria that could be universally applied to all 
post-conflict environments.  Within the three cases it was possible to observe evidence of 
this in the two criteria mentioned and the choice of those three cases allows the argument 
they could potentially be universal.  Still the choice of such vastly different elections and 
areas did limit this research as well.  Research conducted in the same geographical region 
or even within the same country could offer better insight to the sustainability of 
democracy in a given area.  It would also better account for cultural differences and 
preferences that support certain criteria over others.  The BiH case study was included in 
part to account for sustainability but its differences from the other cases and its time since 
the initial conflict made it a challenging choice.  Future research on BiH should be 
compared to prior elections held or to other elections in the area.  It proved very different 
and did not compare well.   
 This research was designed to answer if elections are held in post-conflict 
countries what criteria if present can improve the chances of election success.  The 
research was refined to make it answerable within a single thesis.  It did offer conclusive 
evidence that two criteria were in fact present in successful elections; involvement of 
international actors and the use of the media, but existence of critical infrastructure, 
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reintegration of former combatants were not present in all cases.  This research thus 
provides the reader with an improved understanding of post-conflict elections and serves 
as a foundation for continued development of realistic strategic planning.   
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